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We introduce a comprehensive hybrid failure model for synchronous distributed systems,
which extends a conventional hybrid process failure model by adding communication
failures: Every process in the system is allowed to commit up to f sℓ send link failures and
experience up to f rℓ receive link failures per round here, without being considered faulty;
up to some f saℓ ≤ f sℓ and f raℓ ≤ f rℓ among those may even cause erroneous messages
rather than just omissions. In a companion paper (Schmid et al. (2009) [14]), devoted to
a complete suite of related impossibility results and lower bounds, we proved that this
model surpasses all existing link failure modeling approaches in terms of the assumption
coverage in a simple probabilistic setting.
In this paper, we show that several well-known synchronous consensus algorithms
can be adapted to work under our failure model, provided that the number of processes
required for tolerating process failures is increased by small integer multiples of f sℓ , f
r
ℓ , f
sa
ℓ ,
f raℓ . This is somewhat surprising, given that consensus in the presence of unrestricted link
failures and mobile (moving) process omission failures is impossible. We provide detailed
formulas for the required number of processes and rounds, which reveal that the lower
bounds established in our companion paper are tight. We also explore the power and
limitations of authentication in our setting, and consider uniform consensus algorithms,
which guarantee their properties also for benign faulty processes.
© 2010 Elsevier B.V.
1. Overview
Fault-tolerant synchronous consensus is a classic topic in distributed computing, see [1] for an in-depth treatment and
[2] for a concise overview. Consensus is the problem of reaching agreement on an output value, based on input values
provided locally by the processes of a distributed system. Synchronous processes allow the algorithm to (conceptually1)
execute in a sequence of lock-step rounds, each of which comprises exchanging messages and taking a single computing
step, simultaneously at every process, for processing the receivedmessages and sending out themessages for the next round.
It is well-known that synchronous consensus is solvable under a wide range of different process failure semantics.
For example, n ≥ f + 1 processes are required for achieving consensus among the correct processes, within f + 1
rounds, if at most f processes can fail by crash or omission failures [3]. By contrast, n ≥ 3f + 1 processes are needed
in order to tolerate f Byzantine faulty processes [4]. Consensus has also been studied under several hybrid failure models
[5–9], which distinguish different classes of process failures. In all these models, communication is assumed to be reliable,
however.
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When communication failures enter the picture, the situation is quite different: Without (severe) restrictions,
synchronous consensus is impossible to achieve [10]. Nevertheless, due to the high reliability of modern processors,
communication-related failures like receiver overruns (run out of buffers), unrecognized packets (synchronization errors),
and CRC errors (data reception problems) in high-speed wireline and, in particular, all sorts of wireless networks are
increasingly dominating process failures. Such link failures occur on the communication channel or at the network interface,
and are typically transient and mobile, in the sense that they typically hit different messages to/from different processes
over time.
Perfect communications abstractions, as provided by retransmission schemes in data-link layer protocols [11–13], are
hence usually resorted to. However, apart from increasing the protocol’s complexity, such solutions considerably impair an
algorithm’s real-time properties. This is particularly true for synchronous systems, where the duration of the synchronous
rounds must be enlarged appropriately to cover multiple retransmissions: The overall execution time of a synchronous
algorithm designed for up to k retransmissions per round is the k-fold of the execution time of the link failure intolerant
algorithm — even if there is no link failure in the entire execution at all.
In order to avoid the need of a perfect communications abstraction in synchronous systems, link failuresmust be handled
explicitly somehow. A straightforward approach is to map link failures to process failures: A message hit by a link failure
is usually detected by CRC checking and discarded, which can be viewed as an omission process failure. In rare cases, such
message alterations might go unnoticed, which can be interpreted as a Byzantine process failure. Unfortunately, however,
declaring the sender or receiver of every faulty message as faulty quickly exhausts any reasonable maximum number f of
faulty processes; see [14] for a simple probabilistic analysis. Note that declaring the sender or receiver process as faulty
would also be overly conservative in terms of the failure semantics, since a communication failure does not usually imply a
process failure: After all, the – fault-tolerant – algorithm is executed correctly by such ‘‘communication-faulty’’ processes.
Consequently, link failures should be a category of their own in a more realistic failure model. Unfortunately, however,
there is a discouraging impossibility result for deterministic synchronous consensus in the presence of link failures, which
goes back to Gray’s 1978 paper [15] on atomic commitment in distributed databases:
Theorem 1.1 (Gray’s Impossibility [1, Thm. 5.1]). There is no deterministic algorithm that solves the coordinated attack problem
in a synchronous 2-process system with lossy links.
This result was strengthened by Santoro andWidmayer [10,16], who introducedmobile transmission failures: A different
set of links can be faulty in every round here. This model also covers the scenario where, in every round, a different process
experiences transmission failures on all its outgoing links and hence appears send omissive (termed omissive for short).
Unfortunately, even a single mobile omissive process failure was shown to render consensus unsolvable.
Perhaps influenced by these results, almost all deterministic algorithms for consensus developed during the past 20+
years considered process failures only.2 In fact, only a few algorithms [17–20] have been proposed in the past that can also
deal with a small number of link failures. For substantial link failure rates, this is not sufficient.
As a remedy, one could ask whether some of the pivotal assumptions of the above impossibility results can be
circumvented — without sacrificing the mobile nature of link failures, of course. The synchronous consensus algorithms
developed for the perception-based hybrid failuremodel introduced in this paper3 show that this is indeed possible. Ourmodel
essentially augments a comprehensive hybrid process failure model by several classes of link failures. More specifically,
every process in the system is allowed to commit up to f sℓ send link failures and up to f
r
ℓ receive link failures, in a mobile,
round-by-round fashion [10,25], without being considered (process-)faulty. Optionally, 0 ≤ f saℓ ≤ f sℓ and 0 ≤ f raℓ ≤ f rℓ
links may produce erroneous messages – rather than just omissions – as well. We coined the term perception-based for our
model, since the failure semantics is solely defined in terms of how processes perceive the messages received in a round.
It thus shares many features with the Byzantine variant [26] of the Heard-of Model by Charron-Bost and Schiper [27]. As
discussed in some detail in [14], it is possible to express our link failure restrictions as simple communication predicates
that involve only single rounds, for example.
In the companion paper [14], we provided a comprehensive theoretical study of consensus under our link failure model.
Using bivalency and ‘‘easy impossibility proof’’ techniques, we developed a complete suite of related impossibility results
and lower bounds for the required number of processes and rounds in presence of link failures. They are primarily based
on a generalization of Theorem 1.1, which stresses the importance of unimpaired bidirectional communication for solving
consensus. Our results also allowed us to precisely characterize what makes a process failure actually Byzantine resp.
omissive. Finally, we conducted a detailed analysis of the assumption coverage in a simple probabilistic setting, which
revealed that our link failure model is the only one with a coverage that approaches 1 (rather than 0) for large n. In [28], it
was shown that a decent coverage can also be established in case of small n, even in case of substantial link failure rates.
The present paper provides a suite of consensus algorithms for our perception-based failure model. More specifically,
it will turn out that many existing synchronous consensus algorithms [4,8,29–31] work also, with small modifications,
under our failure model, provided that the number of processes required for tolerating process failures is increased by
2 Just compare Chapter 5 (‘‘Distributed Consensus With Link Failures’’) in Lynch’s book [1] with Chapter 6 (‘‘Distributed Consensus With Process
Failures’’) . . .
3 Part of our work has already been presented in [21–23]. A formal verification of some of our proofs can be found in the SRI technical report [24].
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Cr f rℓ + Csf sℓ , for some small integers Cr , Cs that depend on the particular algorithm. Detailed formulas for the required
number of processes and roundswill be provided for every algorithm; our resultswill prove/reconfirm that the lower bounds
established in [14] are tight. Our results for authenticated algorithms will also reveal that authentication is beneficial not
only for process failures but also for link failures.
The remaining sections of our paper are organized as follows:
• Section 2: Brief overview of related work.
• Section 3: Definition of our hybrid perception-based failure model.
• Section 4: Analysis of the Hybrid Oral Messages algorithm OMH (Section 4.1), and its uniform variant OMHU (Section 4.2).
• Section 5: Introduction of authentication issues for Hybrid Written Messages (Section 5.1) and algorithms OMHA, ZA and
ZAr (Section 5.2).
• Section 6: Analysis of the polynomial consensus algorithms Phase Queen (Section 6.1), Phase King (Section 6.2), and
variants ST1 and ST2 of Srikanth & Toueg’s algorithm (Section 6.3).
• Section 7: Summary and discussion of our accomplishments.
Some conclusions in Section 8 eventually complete our paper.
2. Related work
There are a number of hybrid failure models in the literature [5–9,20,32–38], which differ primarily in the classes of
process failures considered: Early models like [6] distinguish only manifest and Byzantine failures, whereas fully-fledged
models like the ones of [9] and [38] provide a reasonably complete classification of all conceivable failure modes. Hybrid
failure models are interesting, in particular for small-sized systems, since they exploit the fact that less severe failures can
usually be handled with fewer processes than more severe ones. However, none of the existing hybrid failure models that
are applicable to consensus algorithms also covers link failures explicitly.
In fact, there are only a few failure models for synchronous systems in the literature that deal with link failures at all. We
provided a very detailed discussion of the related work in [14]. Hence, we will only summarize some related approaches
here.
One obvious approach to model link failures is to simply map link failures to process failures, as in [30,3]. However, for
significant link failure rates, this quickly leads to the exhaustion of themaximumnumber f of tolerable process failures [14].
Another class of models [18–20] considers a small number of link failures explicitly: Those papers assume that at most
O(n) links may be faulty system-wide during the entire execution of a consensus algorithm. Obviously, such models can
only be applied in case of very small link failure rates. In their landmark paper [10,16], Santoro andWidmayer showed that
consensus cannot be solved in the presence of n− 1 omission resp. ⌊n/2⌋ Byzantine link failures per round, in particular, if
those link failures hit the same sender process. As a consequence, consensus cannot be solved in the presence of just a single
mobile omission or Byzantine faulty process. On the other hand, if the number of moving link failures is restricted to less
than n− 1 omission resp. ⌊n/2⌋ Byzantine link failures per round, consensus can be solved in a constant number of rounds
[39,40].
The consensus algorithmproposed by Reischuk in [17] is the first algorithmwe are aware ofwhichwas proved to tolerate
more than O(n) link failures per round, in addition to f Byzantine process failures: In a system with n ≥ 20f + 1 processes,
at most f of which may be Byzantine faulty in a round, the algorithm tolerates l = n/20 link failures at every process.
An even better link failure resilience (actually, comparable to our results) is provided by the suite of synchronous
atomic broadcast protocols introduced in [41]. Although reliable/atomic broadcasting is usually investigated in a more
communications-oriented context [42], it obviously allows one to solve Byzantine agreement as well. The three algorithms
of [41] tolerate an arbitrary number of processes with omission, timing, or Byzantine failures (if authentication is available)
and work on general communication graphs subject to link failures. Instead of making the number of link failures explicit,
however, it is just assumed that any two processes in the system are always connected via a path of non-faulty links. Since
our failure model respects the requirements of [41] (see [14, Thm. 9]), we can compare our results in Section 5.2.
A similar connectivity-related requirement is used within the ‘‘majority groups’’ in the Paxos-related paper [43]. A
theoretical study of connectivity requirements for consensus in case of bidirectional links can be found in [44].
Unlike in the deterministic setting, link failures are easily tolerated by randomized consensus algorithms like the one of
[45]. Such algorithms circumvent the impossibility result of Theorem 1.1 by adding non-determinism (coin tossing) to the
computations. Still, there is a lower bound 1/(R + 1) for the probability of disagreement after R rounds [1, Thm. 5.5]. It is
interesting to note, however, that our approach of modeling link failures also allows one to circumvent this lower bound:
For a suitably adapted variant of some well-known randomized algorithm, we established a probability of disagreement of
only (1/2)R [46].
We finally note that it is relatively easy to handle omissive link failures in asynchronous systemswith ‘‘fair (lossy) links’’:
If sending an infinite number of messages over a link causes an infinite number of messages to be received, a perfect link can
be simulated by suitable retransmission-based protocols [11–13]. Such time redundancy techniques cannot reasonably be
used in synchronous systems, however: Since the duration of the rounds is fixed, it must be chosen so as to accommodate
some specified number of retransmissions. Clearly, this choice is overly conservative in the typically vast majority of rounds
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where no message loss occurs. In sharp contrast, our approach uses resource redundancy only (additional processes) and
therefore allows one to chose a round duration that does not incorporate retransmission times. A detailed survey of link
failures in partially synchronous and asynchronous systems may be found in [47].
3. Systemmodel
We consider a system of n distributed processes, each identified by a unique id p ∈ Π = {1, . . . , n}. The processes are
fully connected by a point-to-point network made up of unidirectional links. Every pair of processes p and q ≠ p is hence
connected by a pair of links (p, q), from sender process p to receiver process q, and (q, p), from sender process q to receiver
process p, which are considered independent of each other. To simplify our presentation, we also assume that there is a link
(p, p) from every process p ∈ Π to itself. Our system hence contains n2 unidirectional links. Links may reorder messages,
that is, are not assumed to be FIFO.
Note that we will define our system model for a single process per processor for simplicity. If a distributed algorithm
consists of several processes per processor, the process failure model must be applied at the processor-level, in conjunction
with the assumption that all processes executed by a single processor may commit failures at most as severe as the failure
mode of the processor allows. By contrast, the link failure budgets are always on a per process basis.
3.1. Computing model
For our computing model, we employ the standard lock-step roundmodel as used in [10,14]. Every process p is modeled
as a deterministic state machine – acting on some local state statep ∈ Statep – that can send and receive messages from
some (possibly infinite) alphabetM. The initial state of process p is drawn from a set of initial states Initp ⊆ Statep. All
processes execute, in perfect synchrony, a sequence of atomic computing steps forming a sequence of lock-step rounds
k ∈ K = {1, 2, . . .}: In round k, process p performs the following steps:
1. Initialize the received messages vector Rmp to ∀q ∈ Π : Rmp[q] := ∅, where ∅ represents ‘‘no message’’, and sends at
most one message msgkp = Msgp(statep, k) to every process q ∈ Π (including itself); Msgp : Statep × K → M ∪ {∅}
denotes themessage sending function of the algorithm executed by p.
2. Wait for some timewhile receiving messages into Rmp. This timemust be sufficiently long to allow delivery of all correct
round kmessages.We assume that nomessages arrive after thiswaiting period is over; practically, if latemessages arrive,
they are discarded.
3. Perform a state transition from statep to state′p = Transp(statep, rmp, k), where Transp : Statep × Rmp × K → Statep
denotes the state transition function of the algorithm executed by p.
Note that the round number k can be viewed as global time in this model, and is typically part of statep.
The distributed algorithm executed by the processes is hence specified by the pairs of message sending functions and
message transition functions {(Msgp, Transp)| p ∈ Π}. The system-wide n× n received messages matrixRk for round k is the
column vector (rmk1, . . . , rm
k
n)
T of the content of all processes’ received messages vectors Rmp in round k, i.e.,
Rk =

rmk1[1] rmk1[2] . . . rmk1[n]
rmk2[1] rmk2[2] . . . rmk2[n]
...
...
...
...
rmkn[1] rmkn[2] . . . rmkn[n]
 , (1)
with entry rmkp[q] denoting the message that process p received from process q via its incoming link in round k, or ∅ if no
such message (or a detectably bad one) was received.
3.2. Failure model
Consider the system-wide n× n messages matrixMk for round k, which consists of n rows containing the messages
Mk =

msgk1 msg
k
2 . . . msg
k
n
msgk1 msg
k
2 . . . msg
k
n
...
...
...
...
msgk1 msg
k
2 . . . msg
k
n
 , (2)
with msgkp = Msgp(statep, k) denoting the message process p should – according to the algorithm – send to every4 process
q via its outgoing link in round k.
4 For simplicity, we assume that every process sends the same message to all processes in a round — generalizing the model to the case where different
messages can be sent to different receivers in a round is quite straightforward.
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Consider further the n×n sent messages matrix Sk for round k, which consists of n rows containing the messages actually
sent by every process in round k, i.e.,
Sk =

smk1[1] smk2[1] . . . smkn[1]
smk1[2] smk2[2] . . . smkn[2]
...
...
...
...
smk1[n] smk2[n] . . . smkn[n]
 , (3)
with smkp[q] denoting the message process p sends to process q via its outgoing link in round k, or ∅ if no message is sent.
Clearly, in case of no failures,Mk = Sk = Rk for all rounds k. Our failure model distinguishes several classes of (static)
process failures as well as (dynamic, on a per-round basis) link failures. These failures are characterized by how they affect
the matrices Sk andRk.
We distinguish the following classes of process behavior:
Correct: A process p that faithfully follows its algorithm for the whole execution, such that for every round k, it holds that
smkp[q] = msgkp ∀q ∈ Π .
Omission: A process p which at least once fails to send its value to a subset of its receivers, that is, for every round k,
smkp[q] ∈ {msgkp,∅} ∀q ∈ Π , and ∃k0 and q ∈ Π such thatmsgk0p ≠ smk0p [q] = ∅.
Manifest: A process p that at least once fails to send a message to any receiver or sends a detectably bad value (which can
be recognized as erroneous by some local checks) to all receivers, that is, for every round k and∀q ∈ Π , we have either
smkp[q] = msgkp or else smkp[q] = ∅ or smkp[q] detectably bad, and ∃k0 where smk0p [q] ≠ msgk0p for all q ∈ Π .
Symmetric: A process p, which at least once sends the same (generally not detectably) bad value to all receivers, that is,
for every round k, smkp[q] = mkp ∀q ∈ Π for somemkp ∈M, and ∃k0 wheremsgk0p ≠ mk0p ≠ ∅.
Arbitrary: A process pwhich has no restrictions on the messages it sends.
In our system model, during any execution, there may be at most fm manifest, fo omission, fs symmetric, and fa arbitrary
faulty processes. Let
fp_all = fa + fs + fo + fm (4)
abbreviate the total number of process failures. Once a process exhibits a failure, it is considered faulty for the remaining
execution. Processes exhibitingmore than one type of failuremust be counted according to their most severe behavior, with
arbitrary⊇ {symmetric, omissive} ⊇manifest. Thus, a symmetric faulty processes with omissive behavior must be counted
as arbitrary faulty.
In the message matrices introduced above, process failures are such that, during all rounds k, at most the fixed columns
corresponding to the same fm manifest, fo omission, fs symmetric, and fa arbitrary faulty processes in the sent messages
matrix Sk may deviate from the columns in the messages matrixMk. Note that this modeling is based on a sender-centric
view of process failures. In particular, we do not incorporate process receive omission failures [3]. Such failures can be
incorporated via link failures, however.
More specifically, apart from process failures, our model also incorporates communication failures: A link failure hitting
the directed link (p, q) results in rmkq[p] ≠ smkp[q]. As in [10,14], we distinguish the following types of link failures of (p, q)
in a single round k:
Correct link: rmkq[p] = smkp[q]
Lossy link: ∅ = rmkq[p] ≠ smkp[q]
Erroneous link (corruption): ∅ ≠ rmkq[p] ≠ smkp[q] ≠ ∅
Erroneous link (spurious): ∅ ≠ rmkq[p] ≠ smkp = ∅
For some round k, a lossy link is called omission faulty, an erroneous link (corrupted or spurious) is termed arbitrary faulty.
A link producing either type of failure is termed faulty.
Our link failure model is such that, system-wide, up to c · n2 links, for some c < 1, may be faulty in any round. We
cannot allow any set of c ·n2 links to be hit by link failures, however, but require some restriction on the allowed link failure
patterns: Let F k be the n× n link failure pattern matrixwith entries
f kq [p] =
ok if rm
k
q[p] = smkp[q],
om if ∅ = rmkq[p] ≠ smkp[q],
arb otherwise,
which is just the difference ofRk and Sk interpreted as ok, om, or arb on a per entry basis, depending on the corresponding
link behavior. The feasible pattern of system-wide link failures must be such that for every process p and every round k,
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(A1r ) p’s row (fp[1], . . . , fp[n]) in F k contains at most f rℓ entries ≠ ok, with at most f raℓ ≤ f rℓ of those equal to arb. Since
row p corresponds to p acting as a receiver process, we say that pmay perceive at most f rℓ receive link failures (on its
incoming links), with up to f raℓ arbitrary ones among those.
(A1s) p’s column (f1[p], . . . , fn[p])T inF k contains at most f sℓ entries ≠ ok, with at most f saℓ ≤ f sℓ of those equal to arb. Since
column p corresponds to p acting as a sender process, we say that p may experience at most f sℓ send link failures (on
its outgoing links), with up to f saℓ arbitrary ones among those.
Note that every process in the system may experience up to f sℓ send link failures (f
sa
ℓ of them arbitrary), and up to f
r
ℓ
receive link failures (f raℓ of them arbitrary) in every round. Properties (A1
s) and (A1r ) are in fact considered independent
of each other, with the obvious restriction that f rℓ = 0 ⇔ f sℓ = 0. Clearly, the particular links hit by a link failure may be
different in different rounds.
Viewed from a receiver’s perspective, it is sometimes too restrictive to assume that only non-faulty processes get their
inputs and faithfully execute the particular algorithm. We will hence introduce the notion of an obedient process p, which
gets its inputs and faithfully executes its algorithm like a non-faulty process, but may fail in specific ways to communicate
its messages to the outside world, i.e., allows smkp[q] ≠ msgkp. Somewhat arbitrarily, we will consider all processes except
arbitrary and symmetric faulty ones as obedient: Since these processes are (also) allowed to convey the correct value to
their receivers, they must know this value internally. Although we need not care how this is actually accomplished, it is
nevertheless true that the only way to ensure this in practice is to assume that benign faulty processes are obedient.
Definition 3.1. A process is
• benign faulty if it is either manifest or omission faulty,
• obedient if it is either correct or benign faulty,
• consistent if it is either correct, manifest or symmetric faulty.
Note carefully that a generalization from non-faulty to obedient processes does not always work, cp. algorithms OMH vs.
its uniform variant OMHU in Section 4 for an example.
Remarks. 1. Our system model considers process and link failures to be independent. Therefore, even a manifest or
omission faulty process’s broadcast could generate erroneous messages at f saℓ receivers, for example.
2. Since our failure model allows link failures to be transient or permanent, it can also be applied in networks which are
not fully connected, cp. [48,44,20,14].
3. Specified in a round-by-round fashion, our failure model does not contain a direct equivalent for standard crash failures,
where a process can die once and forever even during its broadcast. Standard crash failures must hence be counted as
omission failures in our model: Considering a single round only, crash failures are in fact equivalent to omission failures.
Viewed throughout an execution, however, both manifest and omission failures are more severe than crashes in that
(manifest/omission) faulty processes do not have to remain silent from some round onwards but may resume correct
operation later on. Note that the latter behavior is not equivalent to the crash-recoverymodel of [13], since our processes
may not lose state but must continuously follow the algorithm.
4. Manifest failures are less severe than omission failures since they are perceived symmetrically at all receivers. They
could be produced by a faulty component that, e.g., lost round synchronization and hence sends correct messages in
the wrong round. Note that our manifest failures differ from the system wide detectable ones of [49] and the ‘‘benign
failures’’ of [38,9] by also including symmetric omissions, where no receiver gets a non-∅ value. We provide only strong
manifest failures, however,where all receivers, including the sender itself, get the samevalue. Some relatedwork like [24]
considers weakmanifest failures, where the sender is allowed to deliver the correct value instead of ∅, thereby causing
some asymmetry in the reception. Of course, weak manifest failures can always be incorporated as omission failures in
our model.
5. Arbitrary faulty processes need not adhere to the particular algorithm. Unlike a symmetric or benign faulty process, an
arbitrary faulty process could even send multiple messages in a single round; a receiver may deliver any of those or ∅ in
this case.
4. Hybrid oral messages algorithms
In this section, we will show that the Hybrid Oral Messages algorithm OMH derived from [4] in [8], as well as its uniform
variant OMHU, solves Byzantine agreement under the system model of Section 3. In this and the following sections, we
will assume that fa, fs, fo, and fm specify the maximum number of faulty processes of the appropriate type during the entire
execution. Moreover, we assume that link failures do not hit the message sent by a process to itself. Still, strong manifest
faulty processes deliver ∅ also to themselves, as may omission faulty processes.
In Byzantine Agreement, the value v ∈ V (chosen from a finite set of values V ) of a dedicated transmitter is to be
disseminated to the remaining n−1 receivers; the transmitter already knows its value. Eventually, every non-faulty process
p – including the transmitter – must deliver a value vp ascribed to the transmitter that satisfies the following properties:
(B1) Agreement: If processes p and q are both non-faulty, then both deliver the same vp = vq.
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(B2) Validity: If process p is non-faulty, the value vp delivered by p is• v, if the transmitter is non-faulty,
• ∅, if the transmitter is manifest faulty,
• v or ∅, if the transmitter is omission faulty,
• the value actually sent, if the transmitter is symmetric faulty,
• unspecified, if the transmitter is arbitrary faulty.
A fully-fledged n-process consensus algorithm is obtained by using a separate instance of a Byzantine agreement algorithm
(with n − 1 receivers) for disseminating any process’s local value, and using a suitable choice function (majority) for the
consensus result. Conversely, such a Byzantine agreement algorithm is obtained by just sending the transmitter’s value
directly to n− 1 receivers, and feeding the received values into a n− 1-process consensus algorithm. As a consequence, the
round complexity lower bounds R(Byz, n) resp. R(Cons, n) for n-process Byzantine agreement resp. consensus in any model
are obviously related by R(Cons, n) ≤ R(Byz, n) ≤ 1+ R(Cons, n− 1) (and are known to be the same for standard process
failures, cp. [4]). A similar relation F(Cons, n) ≥ F(Byz, n) ≥ F(Cons, n− 1) holds for the resilience. Bear this in mind when
we compare our Byzantine agreement algorithms to the consensus lower bounds established in [14].
Properties (B1) and (B2) require agreement and validity to hold only for non-faulty processes. Since there are applications
where the behavior of benign faulty processes also matters, cp. [22, Sec. 4], one could ask whether it is possible to extend
those properties to obedient processes. We will hence also consider the following uniform properties [42]:
(UB1) Uniform Agreement: If processes p and q are both obedient, then both deliver the same vp = vq.
(UB2) Uniform Validity: If process p is obedient, the value vp delivered by p is• v, if the transmitter is non-faulty,
• ∅, if the transmitter is manifest faulty,
• v or ∅, if the transmitter is omission faulty,
• the value actually sent, if the transmitter is symmetric faulty,
• unspecified, if the transmitter is arbitrary faulty.
Note that this definition does not extend (B1) and (B2) to symmetric and arbitrary faulty processes, since these classes of
failures do not constrain the internal behavior of faulty processes and can hence be arbitrary. (This issue is also discussed
in [50].) Nevertheless, if symmetric and arbitrary faulty processes would faithfully execute the algorithm, i.e., would behave
erroneous only when emitting messages, then our uniform Byzantine agreement algorithm OMHU would achieve the
uniform agreement property for them as well.
4.1. Byzantine agreement with the algorithm OMH
OMH is a ‘‘Byzantine generals’’ algorithm, where the value v of a dedicated transmitter is to be disseminated to the
remaining n− 1 receivers such that the Agreement (B1) and Validity (B2) properties hold. The algorithm OMH as specified
in Definition 4.1 below uses two primitives:
• The wrapper function R(v) encodes a statement ‘‘I am reporting v’’ as a unique value. Reporting is undone by means
of the inverse function R−1(v), which must guarantee R−1(R(v)) = v. The purpose of the wrapper function is to make
erroneous values (∅) originating in different rounds distinguishable, so that they cannot accumulate overmultiple rounds
and eventually overwhelm legitimate values v ∈ V . Therefore, strictly speaking, only ∅, R(∅), R(R(∅)), R(R(R(∅))),
. . . must actually be distinguishable and different from any v ∈ V here; for each legitimate value v, we can allow
R(v) = R−1(v) = v. Consider Remark 3 below for a simple way to define a suitable wrapper function R(.).
• The hybrid-majority of a set V of values provides the majority of all non-∅ values in V . If no majority exists, the default
value R(∅) is returned. Note that this particular default value is required for securing validity in the presence of an
omission faulty transmitter, see the proof of Lemma 4.3.
Consult [8] for a detailed discussion of the above primitives and the operation of OMH in general.
Definition 4.1 (Algorithm OMH [8]). The Hybrid Oral Message algorithm OMH is defined recursively as follows (the
parameterm gives the number of rounds the algorithm is allowed to run, which is in turn related to the maximum number
of failures; see Theorem 4.4 for details):
OMH(0):
1. The transmitter t sends its value v to every receiver and delivers vt = v.
2. Every receiver p delivers the value vp received from the transmitter, or the value ∅ if a missing or manifestly erroneous
value was received.
OMH(m),m > 0:
1. The transmitter t sends its value v to every receiver and delivers vt = v.
2. For every p, let wp be the value receiver p receives from the transmitter, or ∅ if no value or a manifestly bad value was
received.
Every receiver p acts as the transmitter in algorithm OMH(m− 1) to communicate the value R(wp) to all receivers.
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3. For every p and q ≠ p, letwqp be the value receiver p delivers as the result of OMH(m− 1) initiated by receiver q in step 2
above. Every receiver p calculates the hybrid-majority value of all valueswqp and its own valuew
p
p = R(wp), and applies
R−1 to that value. This result is delivered as vp.
Remarks. 1. There are n−1 receivers in the first instance OMH(m) of the algorithm; the transmitter does not participate in
any way in further recursive instances. Our n-process,m+ 1-round Byzantine agreement algorithm OMH(m) can hence
be viewed as an initial broadcast of the transmitter’s value to all receivers combined with an (n − 1)-process, m-round
consensus algorithm.
2. In our failure model, the transmitter’s delivery vt = v can be considered as the result of sending its value to itself. Hence,
there is no need to treat the case q ≠ p and q = p differently in step 3 in OMH(1). We will use this fact in order to
immediately apply Lemma 4.2 below in OMH’s analysis.
3. During the recursive execution of OMH, multiple (in fact, exponentially many) instances of OMH are concurrently active
in each round. In OMH’s description, we did not explicitly address the question of how received messages are assigned
to the unique recursive instance they belong to. Practically, the unique id of the transmitter process is appended to each
message for this purpose, which produces a string of ids p1p2 . . . pk that uniquely determines the particular recursive
instance (and, by its complement, the set of participating receivers). Note carefully that this stringmust be reconstructed
upon reception of a ∅-value and included in the R(∅)-message prior to submitting it to further recursive instances, which
also results in a simple implementation of the wrapper function R(.).
4. By expanding OMH’s recursive description, it is easy to see that the execution of OMH(m) consists of m + 1 rounds
where messages are wrapped and forwarded only, followed by the backwards-recursive computation (hybrid-majority
+ unwrapping) in step 3 of all instances, cp. the EIG-tree representation in [51, p. 105].
By adopting and extending the analysis of [8] to our perception-based failuremodel, wewill now show that OMH satisfies
(B1) and (B2).
Beforewe start our analysis, we present a generally applicable technical Lemma4.2,which shows that a commondecision
value is reached among all obedient processes if sufficiently many processes have sent the same value. More specifically, let
us assume that all processes p ∈ S of some set of processes S convey their local valueswp to an arbitrary obedient receiver q
(possibly q ∈ S) in some round of the execution of a certain (multi-round) algorithm. Conveying means that all p ∈ S send
R(wp) to q, which computes R−1 of the hybrid-majority among the set of received values as its result vq. Conveying occurs
in steps 2 and 3 of OMH(1), for example. Note carefully that also a manifest faulty sender process pm could send R(wpm) in
the conveying round, since manifest failures need not occur in every round.
Lemma 4.2. For any f , fa, fo, fs, fm, f sℓ , f
r
ℓ , f
ra
ℓ ≥ 0, let some set of processes S be given that convey their values to an obedient
receiver q in some round of the execution of a distributed algorithm.
(a) If |S| > 2f + f rℓ + f raℓ + 2(fa + fs)+ 2fo + fm and all but at most f of the non-faulty or manifest faulty processes p ∈ S
(1) convey the same valuewp = ν , then q computes vq = ν ,
(2) convey values taken from a setW with |W | ≥ 2, then vq ∈ W ∪ {∅}.
(b) If |S| > 2f + f rℓ + f raℓ + 2(fa + fs)+ fo + fm and all but at most f of the obedient processes p ∈ S
(1) convey the same valuewp = ν , then q computes vq = ν ,
(2) convey values taken from a setW with |W | ≥ 2, then vq ∈ W ∪ {∅}.
Proof. Let n′ = |S|, Sf ⊆ S be the set of the atmost f exempted processes, and f ′o resp. f ′m be the actual number5 of omission
resp.manifest failures in S that affect our receiver q in the conveying round by a∅-value (or, in case of an additional arbitrary
link failure, even by a faulty value).
In addition, let f rℓn
′ ≤ f rℓ be the number of actual receive link failures at q that hit non-faulty senders ∈ S\Sf , f raℓm′ resp.
f raℓo
′ be the actual number of arbitrary receive link failures at q hitting manifest resp. omission faulty senders, and f roℓ
′′ be the
number of actual receive link omission failures at q hitting all but actually manifest or omission faulty senders. Clearly, we
have f raℓ + f roℓ ′′ ≥ f rℓn′ + f raℓo ′ + f raℓm′, since we can split f rℓn′ into its arbitrary and omissive components f rℓn′ = f raℓn ′ + f roℓn ′ and
f raℓ ≥ f raℓn ′ + f raℓo ′ + f raℓm′ and f roℓ ′′ ≥ f roℓn ′.
We start with proving item (a.1) of the statements of our lemma. Since all non-faulty and manifest faulty processes
∈ S\Sf convey the same value R(ν), our obedient receiver qwill obtain at least
n′q = n′ − f − fa − fs − fo − f ′m − f rℓn′
identical values R(ν). It will also get at most
n′′q = n′ − f ′o − f ′m − f roℓ ′′ + f raℓo ′ + f raℓm′
5 In this and subsequent proofs, we often need the actual number of failures of a given type. It will be denoted by priming the bound on the maximum
number of failures: 0 ≤ f ′o ≤ fo etc.
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non-∅ values. Since n′ > 2f + f rℓ + f raℓ + 2(fa + fs)+ 2fo + fm here, we have
2n′q − n′′q = n′ − 2f − 2(fa + fs)− 2fo − f ′m − 2f rℓn′ + f ′o + f roℓ ′′ − f raℓo ′ − f raℓm′
> (fm − f ′m)+ f ′o + (f rℓ − f rℓn′)+ (f raℓ + f roℓ ′′ − f rℓn′ − f raℓo ′ − f raℓm′)
≥ 0. (5)
Therefore, R(ν)will indeed win the hybrid majority at process q.
In case (b.1), where all obedient processes ∈ S\Sf convey the same value R(ν), qwill obtain at least
n′q = n′ − f − fa − fs − f ′o − f ′m − f rℓn′
identical values R(ν) and will again get at most
n′′q = n′ − f ′o − f ′m − f roℓ ′′ + f raℓo ′ + f raℓm′
non-∅ values. Since n′ > 2f + f rℓ + f raℓ + 2(fa + fs)+ fo + fm here, we get
2n′q − n′′q = n′ − 2f − 2fa − 2fs − f ′o − f ′m − 2f rℓn′ + f roℓ ′′ − f raℓo ′ − f raℓm′
> (fo − f ′o)+ (fm − f ′m)+ (f rℓ − f rℓn′)+ (f raℓ + f roℓ ′′ − f rℓn′ − f raℓo ′ − f raℓm′)
≥ 0, (6)
by the same reasoning as above, so R(ν)will again win the hybrid-majority at q.
As far as (a.2) [resp. (b.2)] of the statements of Lemma 4.2 is concerned, if the appropriate processes ∈ S\Sf did not all
send the same value but rather values from a setW , then we cannot always guarantee that receiver q obtains a majority for
any of these values (although this could happen). In this case, however, since (5) [resp. (6)] holds if we conceptually replace
each value fromW by a single legitimate value X , it turns out that there cannot be a majority for any value ∉ W . Therefore,
only the default value R(∅) can be returned by the hybrid-majority primitive here, which leads to the alternative return
value vq = ∅. 
Now we are ready for proving that OMH satisfies the validity property (B2). Note that Lemma 4.3 below is void in case
of an arbitrary faulty transmitter, since (B2) does not say anything about the value a receiver ascribes to the transmitter in
this case.
Lemma 4.3 (Validity OMH). For any m ≥ min{1, f sℓ } and any fa, fs, fo, fm, f sℓ , f rℓ , f raℓ ≥ 0, the algorithm OMH(m) satisfies the
validity property (B2) if there are strictly more than 2f sℓ + f rℓ + f raℓ + 2(fa + fs)+ fo + fm +m participating processes.
Proof. Proving (B2) amounts to showing that any obedient6 process p, including the transmitter, delivers
(1) vp = ν = v, if the transmitter is non-faulty,
(2) vp = ν = ∅, if the transmitter is manifest faulty,
(3) vp = v or vp = ∅, if the transmitter is omission faulty,
(4) vp = ν, if the transmitter is symmetric faulty.
The actual proof is by induction onm.
If there are no link failures, i.e., if f sℓ = 0, induction will start at m = 0: In OMH(0), the transmitter sends its value ν
(ν = v if the transmitter is non-faulty) to all receivers and itself; the received values are simply delivered as vp. Properties
(1)–(4) follow immediately from the definition of process failures in Section 3.
If f sℓ > 0, however, inductionmust start atm = 1 as the base case: According to the definition of OMH(1), every receiver q
of step 1 of OMH(1) uses OMH(0) to disseminate its wq to all receivers p (including link failure free transmission to itself,
according to our additional assumption regarding self-transmission),which in turn compute themajority of the non-∅ values
delivered in OMH(0) to obtain the result vp of OMH(1). Let us first consider the cases where the transmitter is consistent,
i.e., (1), (2) and (4) above: Abbreviating the number of initially participating receivers by
n′ ≥ 2f sℓ + f rℓ + f raℓ + 2fa + 2fs + fo + fm +m,
all but at most f sℓ of the obedient receivers p of step 1 of OMH(1) get the same wp = ν (we can simply assume ν = ∅ in
case of a manifest faulty transmitter) due to the transmitter’s at most f sℓ link failures according to (A1
s). Therefore, we can
apply item (b.1) of Lemma 4.2 with f = f sℓ to conclude that every obedient receiver will deliver the same value wp = ν as
the result of OMH(1). In the remaining case (3), where the transmitter is omission faulty, all obedient receivers get either
wp = ν or wp = ∅. In this case, item (b.2) of Lemma 4.2 with f = f sℓ andW = {ν,∅} shows that every obedient receiver q
must deliver either ν or ∅ as required.
6 In order to show (B2), it would be sufficient to replace obedient by non-faulty. However, our proof shows an even stronger result: OMH actually satisfies
uniform validity (UB2).
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Assuming now that the lemma is already true for m − 1 ≥ min{1, f sℓ }, we will show that it is also true for m: For a
consistent transmitter, we have at least n′− f sℓ − fa− fs obedient receivers q of step 1 of OMH(m) that apply OMH(m− 1) to
disseminate their R(wq) = R(ν). Since bothm and the number of participants decreased by one, we can apply the induction
hypothesis to OMH(m−1) to conclude that every obedient receiver p actually delivers R(ν) in this step for every non-faulty
transmitter q. Consequently, any obedient receiver pmust have at least
n′p = n′ − f sℓ − fa − fs − f ′o − f ′m
values equal to R(ν) among the at most n′′p = n′ − f ′a − f ′o − f ′m non-∅ values it may have got at all. Herein, f ′m ≤ fm, f ′o ≤ fo,
and f ′a ≤ fa gives the number of ∅-values delivered to receiver p by OMH(m− 1) for manifest, omission, and arbitrary faulty
transmitters q, respectively. Sincem > 0,
2n′p − n′′p = n′ − 2f sℓ − 2fa + f ′a − 2fs − f ′o − f ′m
≥ f rℓ + f raℓ + f ′a + (fo − f ′o)+ (fm − f ′m)+m
> 0, (7)
so R(ν)wins the hybrid-majority at any obedient process p and the final delivery value vp = ν = R−1(R(ν)) follows.
For the remaining case (3), exactly the same reasoning as in the proof of item (a.2) and (b.2) of Lemma 4.2 reveals that
only the default value R(∅) can be returned by hybrid-majority if no majority of either R(ν) or R(∅) exists. This eventually
completes the proof of Lemma 4.3. 
With the help of Lemma 4.3, it is not too difficult to show the major Theorem 4.4 for OMH. Comparison with the tight
consensus lower bound n > f sℓ + f saℓ + f rℓ + f raℓ established in [14] reveals that the algorithm has close to optimal link failure
resilience (as well as optimal resilience w.r.t. Byzantine process failures). The required number of rounds also matches the
tight consensus lower bound fa + fo + 2 of [14] (which is not true for the simple algorithm used for proving tightness of the
above lower bound in [14]).
Theorem 4.4 (Agreement & Validity OMH). For any m ≥ fa + fo + min{1, f sℓ } and fa, fo, fs, fm, f sℓ , f rℓ , f raℓ ≥ 0, the algorithm
OMH(m) satisfies agreement (B1) and validity (B2) if there are strictly more than 2f sℓ + f rℓ + f raℓ + 2(fa + fs) + fo + fm + m
participating processes.
Proof. Since Lemma 4.3 is applicable under the conditions of Theorem 4.4, validity (B2) is evident. Hence, we need to show
agreement (B1) only.
The proof is by induction on m and is an extension of the one of [8]. In the base case m = min{1, f sℓ }, we must have
fa = fo = 0 since m ≥ fa + fo +min{1, f sℓ } by assumption. Hence, the transmitter must not be arbitrary or omission faulty
here, such that Lemma 4.3 also implies (B1).
We can therefore assume that (B1) is satisfied by OMH(m − 1) with m − 1 ≥ min{1, f sℓ }, and have to prove this for
OMH(m). Again, it suffices to consider the case where the transmitter is arbitrary or omission faulty, since Lemma 4.3 also
implies (B1) in the other cases. Since we have at most fa + fo ≤ m −min{1, f sℓ } ≥ 1 arbitrary or omission faulty processes
and the transmitter is one of those, either (1) at most fa − 1 arbitrary faulty processes or (2) at most fo − 1 omission faulty
ones remain among the strictly more than 2f sℓ + f rℓ + f raℓ + 2(fa + fs)+ fo + fm +m− 1 processes. Since obviously
2f sℓ + f rℓ + f raℓ + 2(fa + fs)+ fo + fm +m− 1 > 2f sℓ + f rℓ + f raℓ + 2([fa − 1] + fs)+ fo + fm + [m− 1]
as well as
2f sℓ + f rℓ + f raℓ + 2(fa + fs)+ fo + fm +m− 1 > 2f sℓ + f rℓ + f raℓ + 2(fa + fs)+ [fo − 1] + fm + [m− 1],
we can apply the induction hypothesis and conclude that any OMH(m−1) satisfies (B1). Hence, for any q, any two non-faulty
processes deliver the same value forwqp in step (3) of the algorithm. Note carefully that this actually follows from (B2) if one
of the two receivers is process q, and from (B1) otherwise. Consequently, any two non-faulty receivers get the same vector
of values and hence the same hybrid-majority, which eventually proves (B1) for OMH(m). 
Remarks. 1. Note that the proof of agreement uses only the validity property and the fact that fa and fo are added to the
number of rounds required by validity. Hence, every consensus algorithm that uses forwarding like OMH that achieves
validity for a givenmwill also achieve agreement form′ = m+ fa + fo.
2. Lemma 4.3 and Theorem 4.4 and their proofs are also valid if the at most fm manifest faults were not strong but rather
weakmanifest faults, cf. Remark 4 in Section 3.2. Since a weakmanifest fault allows themanifest faulty sender process to
receive the correct value instead of ∅, it is usually harder to tolerate than a strong manifest one. This is not the case here,
however, since properties (B1) and (B2) need only hold for non-faulty but not formanifest faulty processes— self-delivery
at non-faulty processes is always correct since by assumption it may not be hit by a link failure.
3. The proof of Lemma 4.3 revealed that OMH satisfies uniform validity (UB2): Uniform validity holds not only at non-faulty
but also at (alive) manifest and omission faulty processes. By using this fact in the proof of Theorem 4.4, it is easy to
show that OMH provides agreement not only at non-faulty but also at strong manifest faulty processes: The induction
step (last paragraph in the proof of Theorem 4.4) is valid when one of the two receivers is the manifest faulty transmitter
process q here as well.
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4. It is apparent from Theorem 4.4 that 2fo processes are required by OMH to tolerate fo omission faulty processes, which
is definitely sub-optimal: Algorithms like the one of [3] require only fo < n− 1. This is not due to an overly conservative
analysis, but rather the price paid for OMH’s ability to mask additional symmetric and arbitrary failures. We do not know
whether this price could possibly be avoided by using a more clever algorithm.
5. From the proof of Lemma 4.3, it is apparent that (A1r ) – and one additional round – is only required to eventually rule
out the inconsistencies caused by (A1s). This is solely done in the base case m = 1 of the induction, which implies that
limiting the number of link failures for a single receiver by f rℓ according to (A1
r ) is only required in the last round, where
in turn (A1s) is not explicitly used. This supports our approach of considering both types of failures independently from
each other, recall Section 3.2.
6. For OMH, receive link failures (A1r ) resulting in an omission are easier to tolerate than those that produce a value failure,
cf. Theorem 4.4, since f rℓ + f raℓ = f roℓ + 2f raℓ with f roℓ bounding the number of ‘‘pure’’ omission failures. This is not the case
for send link failures (A1s), since an omission failure appears like a value failure in all but the last round (where send link
failures do not matter, recall Remark 5 above) due to wrapping all ∅-values with R().
4.2. Uniform Byzantine agreement with the algorithm OMHU
In this subsection, we will consider uniform Byzantine agreement with the properties Uniform Agreement (UB1) and
Uniform Validity (UB2), see Section 4.
Originally, we (erroneously) conjectured that the proofs of Lemma 4.3 and Theorem 4.4 carry over literally to uniform
validity (UB2) and uniform agreement (UB1). Formal verification in [24] showed that this is indeed true for (UB2), and our
proof of Lemma 4.3 actually does prove (UB2). But the proof for (B1) cannot be carried over to (UB1): OMH does not satisfy
(UB1) due to the ‘‘asymmetry’’ of transmitter and receivers in conjunction with the ambiguity of (UB2) for omission faulty
transmitters. A simple counterexample is an omission faulty transmitter that sends v to itself but ∅ to all other processes.
The receivers will all agree on ∅, but the transmitter will deliver v. This problem causes the induction step in the proof of
Theorem 4.4 (last paragraph) to fail in the case where one of the two receivers is the transmitter process q, since (B2) does
not guarantee agreement if q is omission faulty. To guarantee (UB1), OMHmust hence be modified.
In [24], a symmetric version of OMH was proposed, where the transmitter participates in recursive instances as well.
This algorithm guarantees uniform validity and agreement for weak manifest faulty processes, but not for omission faulty
processes.
A straightforward algorithm, which guarantees (UB1) and (UB2) without restrictions, could be built atop of OMH by
letting all receivers convey their delivered value back to the transmitter of each recursive instance; the transmitter would
then deliver the unwrapped result of the hybridmajority among the received values and its own value. However, this variant
would almost double the number of rounds and messages required.
This overhead is avoided by the following simple uniform algorithm OMHU, which employs just a single additional
round with a full message exchange: In the final round, all processes (including the transmitter) convey the wrapped value
delivered locally by the original OMH to each other. The final decision value is then computed by unwrapping the result of
a hybrid majority vote applied to the received values. Lemma 4.6 and Theorem 4.7 below show that OMHU satisfy uniform
agreement (UB1) and uniform validity (UB2).
Definition 4.5 (Algorithm OMHU). The Uniform Hybrid Oral Message algorithm OMHU is defined as follows:
OMHU(m),m > 1:
1. Execute OMH(m). Letwp be the value OMH delivers to process p.
2. Every process p sends the value R(wp) to all other processes.
3. For every p and q ≠ p, letwqp be the value receiver p receives from process q, withwqp = ∅ if no or a manifestly erroneous
value was received. Every process p calculates the hybrid-majority value of all valueswqp and its own valuew
p
p = R(wp),
and applies R−1 to that value. This result is delivered as vp.
Lemma 4.6 (Validity OMHU). For any m ≥ min{1, f sℓ } and any fa, fo, fs, fm, f sℓ , f rℓ , f raℓ ≥ 0, the uniform algorithm OMHU(m)
satisfies uniform validity (UB2) if there are strictly more than 2f sℓ + f rℓ + f raℓ + 2(fa + fs)+ fo + fm +m participating processes.
Proof. From the proof of Lemma 4.3, we know that, in case of a consistent transmitter, all obedient processes in OMHdeliver
the same value ν that is conveyed to all processes in the additional round of OMHU. Since at least 2f sℓ + f rℓ + f raℓ + 2fa +
2fs + fo + fm +min{1, f sℓ } + 1 processes participate here, we can apply item (a.1) of Lemma 4.2 with f = 0 to conclude that
every obedient process will receive enough values to eventually deliver ν.
In case of an omission faulty transmitter, the obedient processes in OMH need not agree upon the same value at the end
of OMH but may deliver either ν or ∅. However, item (a.2) of Lemma 4.2 with f = 0 and W = {ν,∅} applies here. Since
W ∪ {∅} = W , any obedient process can deliver ν or ∅ only. 
Theorem 4.7 (Validity & Agreement OMHU). For any m ≥ fa + fo + min{1, f sℓ } and any fa, fo, fs, fm, f sℓ , f rℓ , f raℓ ≥ 0, the
uniform algorithm OMHU(m) satisfies uniform agreement (UB1) and uniform validity (UB2) if there are strictly more than
2f sℓ + f rℓ + f raℓ + 2(fa + fs)+ fo + fm +m participating processes.
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Proof. Due to Lemma 4.6, it only remains to prove (UB1). First of all, as noted in Remark 3 on Theorem 4.4, the original OMH
satisfies agreement (B1) not only at non-faulty, but also at (strong) manifest faulty processes. Hence, both non-faulty and
(alive) manifest faulty processes in OMH deliver the same value ν. Since there are at least 2f sℓ + f rℓ + f raℓ + 3fa + 2fs + 2fo +
fm+min{1, f sℓ }+1 participating processes here, item (a.1) of Lemma 4.2 for f = 0 amply ensures that all obedient processes
will deliver ν as the result of the full message exchange in the final round. 
Comparison with OMH shows that OMHU achieves uniform agreement and validity with the same number of processes
but one additional round, in which n(n− 1)messages are exchanged.
5. Hybrid written messages algorithms
5.1. Authentication
Writtenmessages [4] extend oralmessages by assuming that (1) it is impossible to alter amessagewithout being detected
at the receiver, and (2) that the originator of a message’s content can always be determined, even if the message comes
from an intermediate process. It is generally agreed that electronic signatures can be used to achieve these goals (although
there are some pitfalls [30]). With electronic signatures, each process p uses its private signature σp to sign some piece of
information x, thereby generating the corresponding signed information σp(x). Without knowing σp, it is computationally
infeasible (ideally impossible) to compute σp(x) from x. Recovering the content x of some valid signed information σp(x) is
easily done, however, by applying the (usually public) inverse signature σ−1p .
We will call the process that generated some signed information its originator . A signed message denotes a message that
contains some signed information. Note that the sender of a signed message may be different from the originator of the
signed information it contains.
Definition 5.1 (Authentication Properties). We place the following specific assumptions on the signature scheme:
(SA1) Only process p can be the originator of σp(x).
(SA2) Only process p can change the content x of σp(x).
(SA3) The content of any signed information can be extracted at any process in the system. More specifically, we assume
that any process can compute σ−1p (SI) = x iff SI = σp(x), whereas σ−1p (SI) = ERROR for some distinguished value
ERROR otherwise.
Note carefully that (SA1) implicitly requires countermeasures against replay attacks, since an eavesdropping process
could otherwise inject prerecorded messages from an earlier execution run. This can be avoided by incorporating unique
execution sequence numbers in messages, for example. (SA2) implies that forwarding processes cannot manipulate
signed messages without being detected at the receiver. (SA3) secures that authentication does not introduce new errors
(interpreting a valid signature for an invalid one) or mask present ones (generating an apparently valid x out of an incorrect
SI), cf. [30].
Clearly, the above requirements hold only forunbroken signatures. If process p’s signature has beendisclosed (deliberately
or not), (SA1) and (SA2) do not hold any longer. More specifically, some other process q ≠ p could then manufacture
signedmessages σp(x) as if they originated from process p. Also note that assumptions (SA1) and (SA2) restrict the power of
Byzantine faulty processes and links, such that these faults cannot generate a valid signed message for process p while p’s
signature remains unbroken.
In the subsequent sections, we will investigate authenticated Byzantine agreement algorithms that disseminate the
transmitter t ’s value v ∈ V by forwarding signed messages via paths of distinct processes, one hop per round, as does the
non-authenticated algorithm OMH of Section 4.1: Its recursive execution can be unrolled into a sequence ofm forwarding-
only rounds followed by a final forwarding roundm+ 1, at the end of which all the recursive instances of hybrid-majority
are computed, recall Remark 4 on Definition 4.1.
In round k of every such round-by-round forwarding scheme, a value v that is sent from the transmitter p1 = t along
a chain of distinct processes p2 . . . pk arrives at some receiver q as a multiply signed message M = σpk · · · σp1(v). Due to
failures, however, it may happen that some process pℓ+1 ∈ {p2, . . . , pk, pk+1}with pk+1 = q does not receive a valid round ℓ
message σpℓ · · · σp1(v) but rather ∅. The algorithm ZAr (see Section 5.2) simply stops forwarding in this case, so that no
message M will arrive at q in this case. Alternative algorithms like OMHA and ZA cause pℓ+1 to generate a signed message
σpℓ+1(∅R) containing some specific value ∅R meaning ‘‘I am reporting ∅’’ (like the R(∅) of Section 4.1) in this case, which is
forwarded along the remaining path as usual. Consequently, the final receiver q could get a signedmessage σpk · · · σpℓ+1(∅R)
(or ∅ in case of an omission failure) instead ofM = σpk · · · σp1(v) here as well.
All our algorithms need the string of forwarding process id’s pk, . . . , p1 for any round k message, both for assigning
an arriving message to the appropriate concurrent instance of the algorithm (recall Remark 3 on Definition 4.1) and for
applying the appropriate inverse signature when successively recovering the transmitter’s value v. Consequently, in a real
implementation, pk, . . . , p1 must somehow be incorporated in signed messages. Moreover, any process pℓ+1 generating a
message containing ∅R must encode pℓ, . . . , p1 in ∅R = ∅pℓ,...,p1R . (We will usually use the shorthand notation ∅R, however,
to keep the notation simple.)
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The following Definition 5.2 summarizes the properties of valid information:
Definition 5.2 (Valid Information). For k ≥ 1, let p1, . . . , pk with p1 = t be a sequence of different processes. Some
informationM is valid informationw.r.t. path p1, . . . , pk iff it satisfies the following properties:
(1) M = σpk · · · σpℓ+1(x) for some ℓwith k > ℓ ≥ 0, where all signatures inM are valid.
(2) Non-∅R information: If ℓ = 0, i.e.,M = σpk · · · σp1(x), then x = v ∈ V is a legitimate transmitter value.
(3) ∅R information: If k > ℓ > 0, then x = ∅pℓ,...,p1R (only allowed in some forwarding schemes).
A received message containing valid information is called a valid message; a message containing valid non-∅R resp.
∅R information is a valid non-∅R resp. ∅R message. Received messages that do not contain valid information are locally
detectable and hence manifest faulty. More specifically, in all our algorithms, every process q that receives a forwarded
message containing M = σpk . . . σpℓ+1(x) from process pk checks whether the message is manifest faulty, and delivers ∅
in this case. For simplicity, we assume that this check also includes the validity of the last signature σpk in M; in reality,
checking signatures will usually be deferred to the final roundm+ 1.
Although faulty processes and links can of course generate erroneous messages, their capabilities to generate valid
messages are considerably limited due to authentication. To prove this, we first summarize the effects of authentication
on our system/failure model:
• Every obedient process adheres to the particular algorithm at all times; it may hence sign and broadcast at most one
(valid) message in every round.
• A symmetric faulty process may in principle perform arbitrarily internally and may sign and broadcast even a faulty
message to all receivers consistently. However, it may neither disclose its signature nor sign and forward (or disseminate
otherwise) multiple messages in the same round.
• An arbitrary faulty process may perform arbitrarily (except that it cannot generate non-disclosed signatures of other
nodes). In particular, it may generate, sign and broadcast multiple messages in the same round, collude with other
arbitrary faulty processes, disclose its signature, etc.
• Links are incapable of generating valid signatures, recall (SA1) and (SA2). However, an arbitrary faulty link could inject
signed messages generated elsewhere in the system.
The following Lemma 5.3 establishes that valid forwarding information w.r.t. a path ending in a not arbitrary faulty
process is unique.
Lemma 5.3 (Information Uniqueness). Consider round-by-round forwarding as outlined above, starting at the transmitter p1 =
t, and let q be a process that is not arbitrary faulty. Then, for any sequence p1, . . . , pk of k ≥ 0 different processes, there is at most
one valid information M w.r.t. path p1, . . . , pk, q in the system at all times; M is generated by q in round k+ 1.
Proof. Assuming the contrary, there are times t and t ′ where M = σqσpk · · · σpℓ+1(x) and M ′ = σqσpk · · · σpℓ′+1(x′) with
M ≠ M ′, i.e., ℓ ≠ ℓ′ or x ≠ x′, or both, exist in the system.
Since both M and M ′ contain a valid signature σq(.), both M and M ′ must originate from q by (SA1) and (SA2). Let
M = σq(L)with L = σpk · · · σpℓ+1(x) andM ′ = σq(L′)with L′ = σpk · · · σpℓ′+1(x′) ≠ L. There are only two possibilities:
(a) Both L and L′ is valid information w.r.t. path p1, . . . , pk, i.e., ℓ + 1 ≤ k and ℓ′ + 1 ≤ k according to Definition 5.2. In
this case, both M and M ′ must be generated by the same process q in round k + 1, which is not possible since q is not
arbitrary faulty.
(b) L is valid information w.r.t. path p1, . . . , pk, but L′ = ∅, i.e., ℓ + 1 ≤ k and ℓ′ + 1 > k, due to a receive omission or
a manifest failure. As before, M is generated by q in round k + 1. In order for M ′ to be valid information w.r.t. path
p1, . . . , pk, q as well,M ′ = σq(∅pk,...,p1R ), i.e., L′ = ∅pk,...,p1R , must hold. This is only possible ifM ′ is also generated by q in
round k+ 1, which leads to the same contradiction as before. 
As an immediate corollary, it follows that the out-bound links of a process q that is not arbitrary faulty with unbroken
signature cannot suffer from arbitrary link failures: Since there is at most one valid forwarded message M from q, every
other message generated by a link must be invalid (i.e., manifest faulty). And arbitrary link failures hitting the out-bound
links of an arbitrary faulty process do not increase the process’ adverse capabilities anyway. We hence obtain:
Corollary 5.4. Consider round-by-round forwarding as outlined above. Then, arbitrary link failures need only be counted as
omissive, i.e., one can set f saℓ = f raℓ = 0.
As another almost immediate corollary of Lemma 5.3, the following Lemma 5.5 reveals that information forwarded via
paths with a common prefix that includes at least one not arbitrary faulty process with an unbroken signature is unique.
Lemma 5.5 (Value Uniqueness). Consider round-by-round forwarding as outlined above, starting at the transmitter p1 = t.
Let M = σpk . . . σp1(v) resp. M ′ = σp′k′ . . . σp′1(v
′) be two valid messages containing v resp. v′, which arrive at two obedient
processes p resp. p′ (possibly p = p′) along forwarding paths of length k ≥ c resp. k′ ≥ c with a common prefix of length c ≥ 1,
i.e., p1 = p′1 = t, p2 = p′2, . . . , pc = p′c . If at least one of those c processes is not arbitrary faulty and has an unbroken signature,
then v = v′.
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Proof. Since the message Mc = σpc . . . σp1(v) forwarded by c is unique and M = σpk . . . σpc+1(Mc) and M ′ =
σp′
k′
. . . σp′c+1(Mc), we obviously have v = v′. 
Lemma5.5 immediately implies that, if the commonprefix of a forwarding path is long enough, i.e., k ≥ fa+1, all receivers
that obtain a valid non-∅R message agree on the transmitter’s value. We can prove an even stronger result, however:
Lemma 5.6 (Identity). Consider a Byzantine agreement algorithm with n > f sℓ + f rℓ + fa + fs + fo + fm + 1 processes,
f sℓ , f
r
ℓ , fa, fs, fo, fm ≥ 0, which forwards the value of the transmitter p1 = t along all possible paths of different processes as
outlined above. If an obedient process p receives some value v in a valid message M = σpk . . . σp1(v), where at least one of the
processes in the set {p1, . . . , pk−min{1,f s
ℓ
}} is consistent with unbroken signature, then every other non-faulty process q also gets a
valid message with at most k signatures that contains v.
Proof. Assume that px, 1 ≤ x ≤ k−min{1, f sℓ }minimal, is consistent and thus sendsMx = σpx . . . σp1(v). Note that px cannot
act manifest faulty when broadcastingMx, sinceM would not carry σpx in this case. Since px must have received v correctly
from itself in this case, as must have all non-faulty processes along the forwarding chain p1, . . . , px−1, we can restrict our
attention to obedient processes qwhich are not on the path p1, . . . , px. If there are no link failures, i.e., f sℓ = f rℓ = 0, all those
obedient processes getM ′ = Mx and we are done. If f sℓ > 0, at least n′ ≥ n− 1− fp_all − f sℓ > f rℓ + 1 (with the abbreviation
fp_all as defined in (4)) non-faulty processes getMx and forward it. Every obedient process q thus receives at least one of those
forwarded messages, despite of the at most f rℓ receive link failures it might experience. 
Note carefully that Lemma 5.6 cannot be extended to obedient instead of non-faulty processes q, i.e., our lemma does not
ensure uniform agreement on non-∅ values. More specifically, it cannot be extended to omission faulty processes: If there
is some omission faulty process po in M ’s path prefix p1, . . . , px−1, Mx and hence v is not forwarded to po by px. Unlike in
case of a consistent po, it cannot be guaranteed that the value contained in Mx has already been self-delivered to po either,
since ∅might have been received instead. Hence, po could fail to get some value v present at other obedient processes.
It is instructive to also consider the question of how to model broken signatures. More specifically, assume that some
arbitrary faulty processes, in addition to their own signatures, also know the signatures of at most fb not arbitrary faulty
processes. Knowing the signature of some process p allows malicious processes to generate signed messages on behalf of
p, which makes p to appear arbitrary faulty. However, Lemmas 5.5 and 5.6 reveal that malicious processes cannot do more.
Consequently, the problem of incorporating fb additional broken signatures can be solved by increasing fa to fa + fb.
Since the power of faulty processes is considerably restricted when using written messages, authenticated Byzantine
agreement algorithms should have much better fault-tolerance capabilities than non-authenticated algorithms. For
example, it follows immediately from Lemma 5.6 that all non-faulty processes get the same set of values ∉ {∅,∅R} if the
transmitter’s value is forwarded via all paths of length k > fa + fo + min{1, f sℓ }. This reveals, for example, that the simple
authenticated algorithm SMH of [8], which just forwards the transmitter’s value for sufficientlymany rounds and then takes
the hybrid-majority of all received values, achieves agreement and validity with as few as n > f sℓ + f rℓ + fa+ fs+ fo+ fm+ 1
processes.
In the following subsection, we will introduce and analyze a suite of Hybrid Written Messages Algorithms derived from
the non-authenticated OMH. Starting from a ‘‘naive’’ application of authentication in algorithm OMHA, the effects and
benefits of authentication will be gradually explored and exploited for improving certain aspects, including link failure
resilience, process failure resilience andmessage complexity. The final algorithm ZAr has optimal resilience and polynomial
message complexity, but depends critically upon unbroken signatures.
5.2. Algorithm ZAr
We start our treatment of authenticated algorithms by informally7 introducing an authenticated variant of OMH, derived
from the algorithm OMHA developed in [30], under the system model of Sections 3 and 5.1: It is the same as OMH, except
that every message sent in OMHA(m) for everym ≥ 0 is signed. Moreover, the signature is used as the wrapper function R,
and both missing and manifest faulty messages are reported by a distinguished non-empty value ∅R ≠ ∅. Note that ∅R is
also the default value returned by hybrid-majority (as opposed to the R(∅) value in Section 4.1) if no majority exists.
The correctness proof for OMH in Section 4.1 applies literally for OMHA, although for different parameter settings
(f saℓ = f raℓ = 0). Unfortunately, the performance of OMHA turns out to be no better than that of OMH — except that link
failure resilience is slightly improved:
Theorem 5.7 (Validity & Agreement OMHA [52, Lem. 5.8]). For any m ≥ fa + fo + min{1, f sℓ } and any fa, fs, fo, fm, f sℓ , f rℓ ≥ 0,
algorithm OMHA(m) satisfies agreement (B1) and validity (B2) if there are strictly more than 2f sℓ + f rℓ + 2(fa+ fs)+ fo+ fm+m
participating processes.
Whereas adding authentication to OMH in OMHA only improves the resilience to link failures, migrating the
authenticated algorithm ZA of [30] to the failure model of Section 3 also improves the resilience to process failures.
Informally, ZA just uses the unique empty value ∅R = ∅ (which is also the default value returned by hybrid-majority
7 To save space, the detailed description and analysis of the algorithms OMHA and ZA have been relegated to a research report [52].
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in the absence of a majority), unlike OMHA, which used a distinguished reporting value ∅R. As a consequence, the only
values that may occur during the execution of ZA are the value(s) sent by the transmitter and ∅. There is hence no need for
an ‘‘overwhelming’’ number of non-faulty values in order to compensate ∅R values; even a single non-∅-value is sufficient
here.
However, the correctness of the resulting algorithm ZA depends critically upon unbroken signatures of not arbitrary
faulty processes (but recall the end of Section 5.1 for how to deal with additional broken signatures).
The following Theorem 5.8 shows that ZA satisfies validity (B2) and agreement (B1) with optimal resilience. Comparison
with the tight consensus lower bound n > f sℓ + f rℓ established in [14] reveals that the algorithm has optimal link failure
resilience (as well as optimal resilience w.r.t. Byzantine process failures). The required number of rounds also matches the
tight consensus lower bound fa + fo + 2 of [14].
Theorem 5.8 (Agreement and Validity ZA [52, Thm. 5.9]). For any m ≥ fa + fo + min{1, f sℓ } and any fa, fs, fo, fm, f sℓ , f rℓ ≥ 0,
algorithm ZA(m) satisfies agreement (B1) and validity (B2) if there are strictly more than f sℓ + f rℓ + fa + fs + fo + fm + 1
participating processes.
Although ZA proceeds like OMH, the information flow develops quite differently: According to Lemma 5.6, every process
gets sufficient information to achieve validity within the first two rounds of ZA in case of a not arbitrary faulty transmitter,
regardless of the number of rounds actually employed. This observation finally leads to the optimal algorithmZAr introduced
below.
In fact, even though ZA has a much better resilience than OMHA, it does not fully exploit the benefits of authenticated
messages: We know from Lemma 5.6 that every non-faulty receiver obtains the same set of distinct (unsigned) values ≠ ∅
at the end of ZA(0). There is no need, however, to receive (and hence forward)multiple signedmessages containing the same
value v. Moreover, there is no use in forwarding ∅-values, since they are discarded at the end anyway. Note that item (3) in
Definition 5.2 is hence void here.
In the algorithm ZAr given in Definition 5.9 below, every process p maintains a set wp of legitimate values seen so far,
and forwards only new legitimate values that are added to wp in a round. ZAr dramatically reduces both message and
computational complexity of ZA, from exponential to polynomial. Interestingly, ZAr turned out to be essentially the same
as the authenticated algorithm for atomic broadcasting under Byzantine failures proposed in [53,41].
Definition 5.9 (Algorithm ZAr). LetWp, initiallyWp = {}, be the set of legitimate unsigned values already seen by process p
during the execution. Moreover, let val(M) be the value v contained in a valid signedmessage after removing all signatures,
and val(M) = ∅ otherwise.
ZAr(0):
1. The transmitter t sends the signed messagewt = σt(v) to every receiver, and adds val(wt) toWt if val(wt) ≠ ∅.
2. For every receiver p, if p has received a valid message wp containing a value ∅ ≠ val(wp) ∉ Wp, then p adds val(wp) to
Wp.
ZAr(k),m ≥ k > 0:
1. The transmitter t sends the signed messagewt = σt(v) to every receiver, and adds val(wt) toWt if val(wt) ≠ ∅.
2. For every receiver p, if p has received a valid messagewp that satisfies ∅ ≠ val(wp) ∉ Wp, then p acts as the transmitter
in algorithm ZAr(k− 1) to disseminatewp to all receivers.
3. End of ZAr(m) only: For every process q, if Wq contains a single legitimate value vq, then q delivers vq, otherwise it
delivers ∅.
Using Lemma 5.6, it is not difficult to show that ZAr satisfies validity and agreement:
Lemma 5.10 (Validity ZAr). For any m ≥ min{1, f sℓ } and any fa, fs, fo, fm, f sℓ , f rℓ ≥ 0, algorithm ZAr(m) satisfies validity (B2) if
there are strictly more than f sℓ + f rℓ + fa + fs + fo + fm + 1 participating processes.
Proof. By Lemma 5.6, we know that min{1, f sℓ } + 1 ≤ 2 rounds suffice to ensure that every obedient process gets the
transmitter’s value v if the transmitter is non-faulty or symmetric faulty. If the transmitter is manifest faulty, no receiver
ever gets a non-∅ value. In case of an omission faulty transmitter, Lemma 5.5 ensures that ∅ and v are the only possible
values. Hence, validity is always fulfilled. 
Theorem 5.11 (Validity & Agreement ZAr). For any m ≥ fa + fo +min{1, f sℓ } and any fa, fs, fo, fm, f sℓ , f rℓ ≥ 0, algorithm ZAr(m)
satisfies validity (B2) and agreement (B1) if there are strictly more than f sℓ + f rℓ + fa + fs + fo + fm + 1 participating processes.
Proof. Due to Lemma 5.10, it only remains to show agreement. In our proof, we use the fact that every non-faulty process
obtains the same set of values at the end of round m + 1 by Lemma 5.6. We only have to look at values that ‘‘survive’’
forwarding until ZAr(0), because forwarding stops only if a particular value is already contained in some process’sWp — but
in that case, the earlier message must have already been forwarded. Note carefully that it does not matter here that any two
signedmessage containing the same v are forwarded along different paths: Although the sets of receivers are different, they
differ only in the processes on the already taken paths. All non-faulty ones among those, however, must have received v by
self-reception and, consequently, do not need forwarding.
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The signature chains in the final round have lengthm+1 ≥ fa+ fo+1+min{1, f sℓ }. Consequently, there must be at least
one consistent process px in each such chain p1, . . . , pm+1 with 1 ≤ x ≤ m+1−min{1, f sℓ }. If px is non-faulty or symmetric
faulty, Lemma 5.6 guarantees agreement. If px is manifest faulty, no signed message with m + 1 signatures incorporating
σpx can be received at any process. Hence, every non-faulty process obtains the same set of non-∅ values. 
Remarks. 1. During the first two rounds, ZAr sends the same number of non-∅ messages as ZA. In subsequent rounds,
however, ZAr is clearly superior with respect to communication complexity: From Definition 5.9, it is obvious that every
value v sent by the transmitter is forwarded by any process at most once to all n− 1 receivers. Hence, every v causes at
most (n−1)2 messages during forwarding, so theworst case occurs if the transmitter sends a different value to each of its
n−1 receivers; recall that no other value except ∅ can be generated in the system. Consequently, at most n−1+(n−1)3
messages can be sent system-wide.
2. If the initial transmitter is arbitrary faulty and sends multiple values, then ZAr will always deliver ∅. However, ZA might
deliver one of the sent values v ≠ ∅ in this case, if v has been received by a majority of processes.
We will conclude this section by briefly comparing ZAr to the authenticated algorithm for atomic broadcasting under
Byzantine failures proposed in [41]. The latter was analyzed in a more abstract failure model, where the only requirement
is that the removal of faulty processes and links does not partition the network. For example, non-faulty processes might
even be connected in a chain there, in which case the atomic broadcast algorithmwould need n− 1 rounds. By contrast, we
showed in [14, Thm. 9] that our link failure model ensures that any two non-faulty processes are connected to each other
by at least one non-faulty path of length min{1, f sℓ } + 1 ≤ 2, which explains the comparatively small number of rounds
required by ZAr.
Generally, our approach has the advantage over [41] that it models link failures explicitly on a per-process-basis, rather
than by their effect on the communication graph. In addition, whereas [41] provides a suite of algorithms each targeted to a
specific class of failures, our algorithms have been developed for a comprehensive hybrid failure model. As already noted in
Remark 4 on Theorem 4.4, however, this comes at the price of a suboptimal resilience with respect to benign failures: ZAr
needs n > 2fo + 1 instead of the n > fo + 1 processes of the omission-tolerant algorithm in [41] for tolerating fo omission
failures.
6. Polynomial algorithms
In the previous section, we investigated Byzantine agreement algorithms with (almost) optimal resilience and round
complexity. However, except for the authenticated algorithm ZAr, they all exchange an exponential number of messages,
or messages of exponential size. In this section, we will focus on non-authenticated consensus and Byzantine agreement
algorithms with polynomial communication complexity: We will show that (1) existing algorithms can be employed in our
hybrid perception-based failure model with minor modifications, and (2) that algorithms with sub-optimal resilience with
respect to some failure semantics may have good or even optimal resilience for other failure types.
The algorithms analyzed in the following two subsections solve binary consensus, that is, assuming that every process p
is provided with some initial value xp ∈ V = {0, 1}, the consensus algorithm computes a decision value vq at every process q
that satisfies the following properties:
(C1) (Uniform) agreement: If processes p and q are both obedient, then both compute the same vp = vq.
(C2) Validity: If all obedient processes start with the same initial value ∀p : xp = v, then any non-faulty process q computes
vq = v.
Before going into the details of the polynomial protocols (which we will present in the following subsections), we first
elaborate on some consequences of restricting the initial values to be either 0 or 1. When we say that in some round a full
message exchange is performed, then every (obedient) process sends a message to every process (including itself). When
every message has to contain one of at most two values, then the following lemma can be used to bound the difference
between the number of times two processes see one of these values:
Lemma 6.1 (Difference in Perceptions). Let Cr [v] and Cq[v] be the number of messages containing v received at two obedient
processes r and q in a full message exchange of a system complying with the model of Section 3. Then, |Cq[v] − Cr [v]| ≤
fa + fo + f rℓ + f raℓ .
Proof. Assuming w.l.o.g. Cq[v] > Cr [v], at most fa arbitrary faulty senders could have sent v to process q and x ≠ v to
process r , and at most fo processes could have sent v to q but no message to r . Process failures hence contribute at most
fa+ fo to |Cq[v]−Cr [v]|. The remaining terms originate from link failures: Process q could have received atmost f raℓ messages
containing v from processes that actually sent x ≠ v, and at most f rℓ messages containing v could have been lost in transit
to process r . 
When using amajority test after a full message exchange (e.g., as in line 7 in Fig. 1), inconsistent reception could produce
a majority for the value v at some process q but a majority for x ≠ v at some process r ≠ q. The question arises how big
the lead of v must be at process q to be able to guarantee that r will compute the same majority? This is answered by the
following Lemma 6.2.
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1: for k := 1 to fa + fs + fo + fm + 2 do
2: /* Round 1: full message exchange */
3: send(v) to all nodes [including itself ]
4: receive(vq) from all nodes
5: C[0] := vq : vq = 0
6: C[1] := vq : vq = 1
7: if C[1] > C[0] then v := 1 else v := 0
8: /* Round 2: queen’s broadcast */
9: if k = p then
10: send(v) to all nodes [including itself ]
11: receive(vqueen)
12: if vqueen = ∅ then vqueen := 0
13: if C[v] ≤ C[1− v] + 2fa + fo + 2f rℓ + 2f raℓ then
14: v := vqueen
Fig. 1. Hybrid Phase Queen algorithm, code for process p.
Lemma 6.2 (Deviation of Differences). Let Cr [v] and Cq[v] be the number of messages containing v ∈ {0, 1} received at two
obedient processes r and q in a binary full message exchange of a system complying with Section 3. For∆q[v] = Cq[v]−Cq[1−v]
and∆r [v] = Cr [v] − Cr [1− v], we obtain |∆q[v] −∆r [v]| ≤ 2fa + fo + 2f rℓ + 2f raℓ .
Proof. We denote by∆ the difference∆q[v] − ∆r [v] and we assume, w.l.o.g., that it is non-negative. Clearly, ignoring the
effect of link failures for the moment, the broadcasts of processes with consistent behavior (i.e., correct, symmetric faulty
and manifest faulty) are received in the same way by all processes, and thus have no influence on ∆ (they do, of course,
influence∆q[v]).
When an inconsistently faulty process sends v to q and 1− v to r (instead of sending v to both), then (as r receives one
more message containing 1 − v and one less with v) ∆r [v] can become smaller than ∆q[v] by two. Thus, ∆ is increased
by two by this failure. An omission faulty process can either fail to send 1 − v to q or v to r , but not both. In any case, ∆ is
increased by at most one here.
Turning to the worst case deviation caused by link failures, we observe that for each link failure that q experiences the
same arguments as above apply, i.e., each of the f raℓ arbitrary receive link failures contributes two to∆, while each omissive
one contributes one to∆. The same is true for the reception of r , possibly for a different set of affected in-bound links. Thus,
in the worst case, the 2f raℓ arbitrary link failures at q and r contribute up to 4f
ra
ℓ to∆, while the 2(f
r
ℓ − f raℓ ) link omissions at
q and r contribute up to 2(f rℓ − f raℓ ). Adding up these numbers, we arrive at a total of 2fa + fo + 2f rℓ + 2f raℓ as asserted. 
6.1. Phase queen algorithm
The Phase Queen Protocol introduced in [31] is a simple binary consensus algorithm for systems with n > 4f processes,
at most f of which may be arbitrary faulty, and no link failures. It assumes unique process identifiers ∈ {1, . . . , n}, uses
constant size (1-bit) messages and takes f + 1 phases, each consisting of 2 rounds. Our contribution is a modified version
of the original algorithm that can cope with hybrid process and link failures according to the system model of Section 3.
Fig. 1 shows the pseudocode of our hybrid algorithm, which consists of fp_all+2 = fa+ fs+ fo+ fm+2 phasesmade up of
two rounds each. In the first round of every phase, every process p broadcasts its current preference value vp to all processes
in the system (including itself) and collects the resulting messages from its peers (i.e., a full message exchange). Process p
then counts how many processes sent preferences for 0 and 1, respectively, and updates its vp accordingly. In the second
round of each phase, only one specific process (the Phase Queen, whose identifier is equal to the current phase number)
broadcasts its new preference. This value is used by all processes in the system to break ties.
Note that we made only two non-trivial changes to the original algorithm: First, the bound in the decision when to use
the queen’s broadcast (line 13 in Fig. 1) had to be adapted to our hybrid failure model. Second, in order to improve the
resilience with respect to non-arbitrary failures, the original condition C[1] > n/2 in the update of the preference value
(line 7) had to be replaced by the simple majority test C[1] > C[0]. Note carefully that a message omission leads to a value
∅ ∉ {0, 1}, i.e., is neither counted in C[1] nor in C[0].
In the following, we call a process p which does not emit any messages from round k onwards (i.e., smk
′
p [q] for all q and
all k′ ≥ k) to be actually dead, and let dk denote the number of actually dead processors among the manifest or omission
faulty ones by the beginning of phase k; obviously fm + fo ≥ di ≥ dj must hold8 for all i ≥ j. We will need this value to
discriminate between obedient processes and benign faulty processes that are dead.
8 This allows clean as well as unclean crash failures. Whereas a clean crash can be accounted for in fm , an unclean one is an asymmetric omission in one
round followed by symmetric omissions in all later round, and must thus be accounted for in fo .
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As a first step in showing the correctness of the Phase Queen protocol, we look at what happens when a certain amount
of processes all share the same value. More specifically, we show that once sufficiently many processes have the same
preference value, it will not change any more. Lemma 6.3 will subsequently be used to show the validity property (C2).
Lemma 6.3 (Persistence of Agreement). If at least n− fa − fs − dk − f sℓ obedient processes prefer v ∈ {0, 1} at the beginning of
phase k ∈ {1, . . . , fp_all + 2} in a system with n > 4fa + 2fs + 2fo + fm + 2f sℓ + 3f rℓ + 3f raℓ , then all obedient processes prefer v
at the end of phase k.
Proof. Since n− fa− fs− dk− f sℓ obedient processes prefer v at the beginning of phase k, every obedient process q receives
Cq[v] ≥ n− fp_all − f sℓ − f rℓ preferences for v in the first round of phase k. Moreover, since the preference of fa + fs + f sℓ alive
processes was left unspecified in our assumptions and at most f raℓ links may cause erroneous values, process q could also
get Cq[1− v] ≤ fa + fs + f sℓ + f raℓ preferences for 1− v. This implies
Cq[v] ≥ n− fp_all − f sℓ − f rℓ
> 3fa + fs + fo + f sℓ + 2f rℓ + 3f raℓ
≥ Cq[1− v] + 2fa + fo + 2f rℓ + 2f raℓ ,
so every obedient process q updates its preference vq to v in line 7 in Fig. 1 and ignores the queen’s broadcast in line 13. 
The second major lemma is a prerequisite for showing that agreement can be reached by means of a non-faulty queen
breaking tie.
Lemma 6.4 (Agreement). Let g be a phase whose queen is non-faulty. Then, at least n− fa − fs − dg+1 − f sℓ obedient processes
finish phase g with the same preference.
Proof. Since the queen g is non-faulty, it sends the same vg to all receivers. Assume first that all obedient processes use
the value vqueen received from g as their new preference in line 14 of Fig. 1. According to (A1s), at most f sℓ of those could
have received a queen’s preference vqueen ≠ vg ,9 such that at least n− fa − fs − dg+1 − f sℓ obedient processes have set their
preference to vg by the end of phase g .
If, on the other hand, some obedient process p ignores the queen’s broadcast and uses its ownmajority value v as its new
preference, Cp[v] − Cp[1− v] > 2fa + fo + 2f rℓ + 2f raℓ according to line 13 in Fig. 1. Hence, for every other obedient process
q (including the non-faulty queen g), Cq[v] − Cq[1− v] ≥ Cp[v] − Cp[1− v] − 2fa− fo− 2f rℓ − 2f raℓ > 0 by Lemma 6.2, so g
must have set its preference to v in line 7 as well. Process p can therefore safely use its majority value instead of the queen’s
in this case, since they are the same. 
By means of Lemmas 6.3 and 6.4, it is not difficult to prove the following major Theorem 6.5. Comparison with the tight
lower bound n > f sℓ + f saℓ + f rℓ + f raℓ from [14] reveals that the algorithm has sub-optimal link failure resilience (as well as
sub-optimal resilience w.r.t. Byzantine process failures). The required number of rounds is also more than twice the tight
lower bound fa + fo + 2 of [14].
Theorem 6.5 (Phase Queen). Under the system model of Section 3 with fa, fs, fo, fm, f rℓ , f
ra
ℓ , f
s
ℓ ≥ 0 and n > 4fa + 2fs + 2fo +
fm+ 2f sℓ + 3f rℓ + 3f raℓ , the Phase Queen algorithm of Fig. 1 solves binary consensus in 2(fa+ fs+ fo+ fm+ 2) rounds with a total
of (fa + fs + fo + fm + 2)(n+ 1) 1-bit message broadcasts from obedient processes.
Proof. Lemma 6.3 already implies the validity property (C2): If all obedient processes start out with the same value v, they
will continue to prefer v until the algorithm terminates after fp_all+2 phases, since there are n−fa−fs−dk−f sℓ ≥ n−fp_all−f sℓ
non-faulty processes, in any phase k.
To show agreement (C1), we note that all but at most f sℓ obedient processes will have the same preference at the end of
a non-faulty queen’s phase g by Lemma 6.4. The bound on the number of faulty processes ensures that at least one phase
g ∈ {1, . . . , fp_all+1} has a non-faulty queen. Since the algorithm takes fp_all+2 phases, Lemma 6.3 assures that all obedient
processes will have the same (persistent) preference by the end of phase g + 1, no matter how many phases with faulty
queens follow.
To justify the claimed time and communication complexity of our algorithm, we note that there is one full message
exchange consisting of n broadcasts in the first round and one additional queen’s broadcast in the second round of every
phase. Hence, at most (fp_all + 2)(n+ 1) 1-bit message broadcasts are performed during the whole execution by processes
that faithfully10 follow the algorithm in Fig. 1. 
As a final remark, we note that the number of message broadcasts of the Phase Queen algorithm could be reduced by
one by omitting the queen’s broadcast in the last phase, since – according to the proof of Theorem 6.5 – no obedient process
uses vqueen in the last phase.
9 At most f saℓ processes could receive the opposite value 1− vg , and the remaining f sℓ − f saℓ ones could suffer from omissions, that is, deliver ∅.
10 Clearly, there is no way to restrict the number of message broadcasts initiated by an arbitrary faulty process.
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1: for k := 1 to fa + fs + fo + fm + 2 do
2: /* Round 1: initial full message exchange */
3: send(v) to all nodes [including itself ]
4: receive(vq) from all nodes
5: C[0] := vq : vq = 0
6: C[1] := vq : vq = 1
7: /* Round 2: C[j] full message exchange */
8: for all j ∈ {0, 1} do
9: if C[j] > C[1− j] + fa + fo + f rℓ + f raℓ then
10: M[j] := 1
11: else
12: M[j] := 0
13: send(M) to all nodes [including itself ]
14: receive(Mq) from all nodes
15: ∀j ∈ {0, 1} : D[j] := q : Mq[j] = 1
16: if D[1] > fa + fs + f raℓ then v := 1 else v := 0
17: /* Round 3: king’s broadcast */
18: if k = p then
19: send(v) to all nodes [including itself ]
20: receive(vking)
21: if vking = ∅ then vking := v
22: if D[v] ≤ 2fa + fs + fo + f rℓ + 2f raℓ then
23: v := vking
Fig. 2. Hybrid Phase King algorithm, code for process p.
6.2. Phase King algorithm
The Phase King Protocol of [31] improves the Phase Queen algorithm by adding one round to every phase, in which the
information on the processes’ possible preferences after the first round are exchanged system-wide. This reduces the sub-
optimal process failure resilience n > 4fa of the Phase Queen algorithm to the optimal n > 3fa. We provide a hybrid variant
of this algorithm in Fig. 2, which can cope with process and link failures according to Section 3.
The proof for the Phase King Protocol is similar to the one for the Phase Queen Protocol: The first Lemma 6.6 will show
that once sufficiently many processes have the same preference value, it will not change any more.
Lemma 6.6 (Persistence of Agreement). If at least n − fa − fs − dk − f sℓ obedient processes prefer v at the beginning of phase
k ∈ {1, . . . , fp_all+ 2} in a system with n > 3fa+ 2fs+ 2fo+ fm+ 2f sℓ + 2f rℓ + 2f raℓ processes, then all obedient processes prefer
v at the end of phase k.
Proof. Since at least n − fp_all − f sℓ non-faulty processes broadcast v in the first full message exchange, every obedient
process q obtains Cq[v] ≥ n− fp_all − f sℓ − f rℓ and Cq[1− v] ≤ fa + fs + f sℓ + f raℓ according to our failure model in Section 3.
Similar to the proof of Lemma 6.3, this leads to
Cq[v] > Cq[1− v] + fa + fo + f rℓ + f raℓ ,
which implies that every non-faulty process among the obedient ones will send the same M[j] in the second round.
Therefore, every obedient process r obtainsDr [v] ≥ n−fp_all−f rℓ andDr [1−v] ≤ fa+fs+f raℓ and thus sets its local preference
to the same value v in line 16 in Fig. 2; the king’s value vking is ignored in line 22 since Dr [v] > 2fa + fs + fo + f rℓ + 2f raℓ . 
The second major lemma is again a prerequisite for showing that agreement can be reached by means of a non-faulty
king breaking tie.
Lemma 6.7 (Agreement). Let g be a phase whose king g is non-faulty. If n > 3fa + 2fs + 2fo + fm + 2f sℓ + 2f rℓ + 2f raℓ , then at
least n− fa − fs − dg+1 − f sℓ obedient processes start phase g + 1 with the same preference.
Proof. At the end of phase g , one of the following cases applies in line 22 of Fig. 2:
(1) Dp[vp] ≤ 2fa + fs + fo + f rℓ + 2f raℓ for every obedient process p, which thus assigns the value vking to vp. Since at most f sℓ
processes could have received a value vking different from the value vg actually sent, at least n− fa− fs− dg+1− f sℓ obedient
processes end up with the same preference vg as asserted.
(2) Dp[vp] > 2fa + fs + fo + f rℓ + 2f raℓ for some obedient process p. We have to show that p’s preference at the end of the
phase is equal to the king’s value vg in this case, which will again imply that all obedient processes except at most f sℓ will
end up with a preference for the king’s value vg — either by receiving it, or by being convinced of it in the first place. We
distinguish the two possible cases here: If vp = 1, it must be that Dg [1] > fa + fs + f raℓ and hence vg = 1, since Lemma 6.1
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implies Dg [1] ≥ Dp[1] − fa − fo − f rℓ − f raℓ > fa + fs + f raℓ . If, on the other hand, vp = 0, we can use the following argument
to show that vg cannot be 1:
We first show that if an obedient process q sends Mq[b] = 1 for some b ∈ {0, 1} in the second round, then no obedient
process r can send Mr [1 − b] = 1. Assuming the contrary, line 9 in Fig. 2 would require both ∆q = Cq[b] − Cq[1 − b] >
fa + fo + f rℓ + f raℓ and−∆r = Cr [1 − b] − Cr [b] > fa + fo + f rℓ + f raℓ , and hence ∆q − ∆r > 2fa + 2fo + 2f rℓ + 2f raℓ , which
would contradict Lemma 6.2.
Now, since we have Dp[0] > 2fa + fs + fo + f rℓ + 2f raℓ , at least one non-faulty process must have sent M[0] = 1 in
the second round. Consequently, as we have just shown, no obedient process can have sent M[1] = 1. Since this implies
Dq[1] ≤ fa+ fs+ f raℓ for any obedient process q (including the king g), vg is set to 0 in line 16, just before the king’s broadcast.
This eventually completes the proof of Lemma 6.7. 
We can now show the following major Theorem 6.8. Comparison with the lower bound n > f sℓ + f saℓ + f rℓ + f raℓ from [14]
reveals that the algorithm has again sub-optimal link failure resilience. Unlike the Phase Queen algorithm, it has optimal
resilience w.r.t. Byzantine process failures, however. The required number of rounds is more than three times the lower
bound fa + fo + 2.
Theorem 6.8 (Phase King). Under the system model of Section 3with fa, fs, fo, fm, f rℓ , f
ra
ℓ , f
s
ℓ , f
sa
ℓ ≥ 0 and n > 3fa+ 2fs+ 2fo+
fm+2f sℓ +2f rℓ +2f raℓ , the Phase King algorithm of Fig. 2 solves binary consensus using 4(fa+ fs+ fo+ fm+2)message exchanges
with a total of (fa + fs + fo + fm + 2)(3n+ 1) bits being sent by obedient processes.
Proof. Since Lemmas 6.6 and 6.7 are the same as Lemmas 6.3 and 6.4, respectively, the proof of the agreement (C1) and
validity property (C2) is literally the same as in Theorem 6.5. To justify the claimed time and message complexity, Fig. 2
reveals that every process broadcasts three bits per phase in the first two rounds. Adding the single message broadcast by
every phase’s king, we arrive at (fp_all + 2)(3n+ 1) bits being sent by obedient processes. 
As for the Phase Queen algorithm, it would again be possible to omit the king’s broadcast in the last round of this
algorithm.
6.3. Srikanth & Toueg algorithm
In this section, we will analyze a hybrid version of the simple binary Byzantine agreement algorithm of [29] under the
system model of Section 3. Unlike OMH and the other Byzantine agreement algorithms considered earlier in this paper,
which follow the asymmetric ‘‘Byzantine Generals’’ style [4] involving a single transmitter and n−1 receivers, the Byzantine
agreement algorithms consideredhere aremore symmetric in that allnprocesses [including the transmitter] act as receivers.
Note that this allows one to directly apply consensus lower bounds, recall the discussion in Section 4.
Recall also from Section 4 that a Byzantine agreement algorithm disseminates some value v of the transmitter to all
receivers. Within a fixed number of rounds, every non-faulty receiver pmust deliver a value vp ascribed to the transmitter
that satisfies the following properties (with ∅ := 0):
(B1) Agreement: If receivers p and q are both non-faulty, then both deliver the same vp = vq.
(B2) Uniform Validity: If receiver p is obedient, the value vp delivered by p is
• v, if the transmitter is non-faulty,
• v or ∅, if the transmitter is omission or manifest faulty,
• the value actually sent, if the transmitter is symmetric faulty,
• unspecified, if the transmitter is arbitrary faulty.
Note that there is a change in the validity property with respect to manifest faulty transmitters. This is necessary to allow
for algorithms where the transmitter also participates in the algorithm after sending out its initial value (as this is the case
in the composition of Algorithm 3 with one of the broadcasting algorithms introduced later on).
The algorithm of [29] is built upon a reliable broadcast service broadcast(m, k) and the corresponding accept(s,m, k),
where s denotes the identifier of the sending process, m is the message, and k denotes the round in which s broadcasts m.
The semantics of the broadcast service is fully captured by the following three uniform [42] properties:
(C) Uniform correctness: If a non-faulty process s executes broadcast(m, k) in round k, then every obedient process
accepts(s,m, k) in the same round.
(U) Uniform Unforgeability: If obedient process s never executes broadcast(m, k), then no obedient process ever
accepts(s,m, k).
(R) Uniform Relay: If an obedient process accepts(s,m, k) in round r ≥ k, then every obedient process also accepts(s,m, k)
in round r + 1 or earlier.
One way to implement the above broadcast primitive in systems without link failures is by means of signedmessages, as
in Section 5.1, in conjunction with relaying, i.e., forwarding of acceptedmessages to all other processes in the system.While
algorithms based on authenticated messages, like the one of Fig. 3, are simple, easy to understand and often have superior
fault-tolerance properties (Compare OMH with ZA, in Section 4.1 resp. 5.2), there are some drawbacks:
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1: /* Transmitter t */
2: if p = t then v := m else v := 0
3: /* Receiver p */
4: for l := 1 to fa + fs + fo + fm + 1 do
5: if v = 1 and not yet broadcast(_ , _ ) then
6: broadcast(1, l)
7: if accepted(pk, 1, lk) from l distinct pk including t then
8: v := 1
Fig. 3. The hybrid binary Byzantine agreement algorithm ST, code for process p.
Cryptographicmethods (see for example [54] for an overview) typically used for authentication are expensive operations,
which cannot always be afforded in power/bandwidth-limited systems. Moreover, there is always a non-zero probability of
guessing or forging a process’s signature, thus no present cryptographic authentication technique is unconditionally secure.
An authenticated algorithm’s fault-tolerance properties, however, depend critically upon an uncompromised cryptosystem.
Moreover, cryptography does not help in overcoming the effects of link failures, as the above properties cannot be
guaranteed when messages can be lost.
Those deficiencies make the non-authenticated implementation of the broadcast primitive developed by Srikanth &
Toueg in [29] attractive. Instead of using cryptography, their simulated broadcast primitive relies upon the idea of letting
all processes witness a process’s message broadcast. Using this approach, the algorithm of [29, Fig. 2] unconditionally
guarantees the correctness (C), unforgeability (U) and relay (R) properties, provided that n > 3f and at most f processes
are arbitrary faulty. In order to do, so processes have to exchange messages in the course of multiple rounds, even if the
broadcasting process is non-faulty. In Sections 6.3.2 and 6.3.3, we present variants of this simulation (cf. [51, Chapter 12])
which tolerate link failures.
All these simulations use multiple rounds to ensure the three properties of the broadcast primitive. In order to avoid
confusion, we will refer to the rounds that implement the broadcasting primitive as rounds, while the (macro-)rounds of
the algorithm using the primitive are referred to as phases.
6.3.1. Hybrid Byzantine agreement (algorithm ST)
Fig. 3 shows our hybrid version of the algorithm for binary Byzantine Agreement of [29], which is itself based upon the
algorithm of [55]. Algorithm ST differs from the original algorithm only in that the number of faulty processes t has been
replaced by fp_all = fa + fs + fo + fm and that we hid relaying, which was done explicitly in [29, Fig. 1], within broadcast( )
for simplicity.
The algorithm proceeds in fp_all + 1 phases, where the only value broadcast by obedient processes is 1; the value 0 is
decided upon by default. An obedient transmitter broadcasts 1 in phase 1 if agreement is to be reached on the valuem = 1.
Any obedient receiver p sets v := 1 at the end of phase l and hence decides 1, if it has accepted l messages from different
processes Pl = {p1, . . . , pl}, one of which must be the transmitter. Note that p ∉ Pl since p still has v = 0 during phase l.
The assumed correctness and relay properties ensure that all other correct processes accept all messages ∈ Pl plus the one
broadcast by p by phase l+ 1, hence they will also decide 1 by then.
If m = 0 is the value to be agreed upon, an obedient transmitter never broadcasts any message. By the unforgeability
property, no obedient receiver ever accepts any message originating from the transmitter. Consequently, no obedient
process sets v := 1 and all must hence decide 0 by default. Note that a manifest faulty transmitter is indistinguishable
from a correct transmitter that tries to communicate m = 0, which explains why we assumed ∅ := 0 for the validity
property (B2).
By formalizing the above line of reasoning, the following Theorem 6.9 shows that our hybrid algorithm achieves
agreement (B1) and validity (B2), provided that the underlying communication system guarantees (C), (U) and (R).
Theorem 6.9 (Hybrid Authenticated Algorithm). Given a broadcast primitive that guarantees (C), (U) and (R) under the system
model of Section 3, the hybrid algorithm ST of Fig. 3 achieves properties (B1) and (B2) of Byzantine agreement within fa + fs +
fo + fm + 1 phases provided that n ≥ fa + fs + fo + fm + 1. Moreover, every obedient process calls broadcast( ) at most once
during the whole execution.
Proof. We first show that validity (B2) is achieved. Since (B2) is void in case of an arbitrary faulty transmitter, we only have
to deal with the following cases:
(1) If the transmitter t is non-faulty and agreement is to be reachedon0, then t does not callbroadcast( ). Hence, no obedient
process will ever accept(t, 1, _) due to (U) and all obedient receivers will decide upon the default value v = 0. If, on
the other hand, agreement is to be reached on 1, a non-faulty transmitter t calls broadcast(1, 1). By (C), all obedient
processes will accept this message in phase 1 and set v := 1 as required.
(2) If the transmitter has m = 0 and is omission faulty or manifest faulty during its broadcast (that is, it either does not
call broadcast( ) at all, because it crashed or it broadcasts an obviously bad value), then (U) ensures that no non-faulty
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1: /* Code for initial phase k */
2: /* Round 2k: Broadcaster only (entered by broadcast(m, k)) */
3: send(init,m, k) to all nodes [including itself ];
4: /* Round 2k+ 1: All processes */
5: if received(init,m, k) from s in round 2k then
6: send(echo, s,m, k) to all nodes [including itself ]
7: if received(echo, s,m, k) in round 2k+ 1 from≥ n− fa − fs − fo − fm − f sℓ − f rℓ then
8: accept(s,m, k) [once]
9: /* Code for phase l ≥ k+ 1, i.e., rounds 2l, 2l+ 1: All processes */
10: if received(echo, s,m, k) in the previous round from≥ n− 2fa − fs − 2fo − fm − f sℓ − 2f rℓ − f raℓ
or sent(echo, s,m, k) in previous round then
11: send(echo, s,m, k) to all nodes [including itself ]
12: if accepted(s,m, k) in previous phase then
13: terminate
14: if received(echo, s,m, k) in this round from≥ n− fa − fs − fo − fm − f sℓ − f rℓ then
15: accept(s,m, k) [once]
Fig. 4. The hybrid version of the broadcast primitive for simulated authentication of Srikanth & Toueg, code for process p.
process will ever accept(t, 1, _). Consequently, all non-faulty receivers will decide upon the default value v = 0 = ∅ as
required.
(3) If the transmitter has m = 1 and is omission faulty or manifest faulty (as above), either value is allowed, thus validity
holds trivially in this case.
(4) If the transmitter is symmetric faulty, it appears11 like a non-faulty transmitter (but with a faulty value). Hence, case (1)
above applies withm equal to the value actually sent.
In order to prove the agreement property (B1), it suffices to show that if one non-faulty process sets v := 1, then all
other obedient processes do the same; agreement on 0 occurs per default. Let q be the first non-faulty process that executes
v := 1, and l be the phase in which this happens. Then, qmust have accepted at least l different messages containing a value
of 1 in phase l. We distinguish two cases: If l < fp_all + 1, then any obedient process pwill accept these messages due to (R)
at most one phase later as well. Since pwill also accept q’s broadcast of (q, 1, l+1) in phase l+1 due to (C), it will eventually
end up with v := 1 as required.
If, on the other hand, l = fp_all + 1, then qmust have accepted at least fp_all + 1 messages with a value of 1. However, at
least one of these messages originates from a non-faulty process, which must have executed v := 1 in some phase l′ < l.
This contradicts our assumption of q being the first process to do so, so at least one non-faulty process must call accept( )
strictly before the last phase. 
6.3.2. Hybrid simulated broadcast primitive
In this section, we present a variant of the simulated broadcast primitive of [29, Fig. 2], which works in the model of
Section 3.1. Like the original algorithm, our hybrid version (Fig. 4) proceeds in rounds, where two kinds of messages are
exchanged. When some process s starts a broadcast by calling broadcast(m, k) in phase k, it enters the code in round 2k.
It first sends a message (init,m, k) to all processes in the system, which is answered by every witness with a message
(echo, s,m, k) in round 2k + 1. A process calls accept(p,m, k) in some round l ≥ k when it receives (echo, s,m, k) from
at least n − fp_all − f sℓ − f rℓ different processes. When the initial broadcaster is non-faulty (or symmetric faulty) then every
process will receive this number of echo-messages in round 2k + 1. When the initial broadcaster p is faulty, additional
rounds may be necessary (or the message might never be accepted). In these additional rounds, a process that did not yet
send (echo, s,m, k) could get sufficient evidence that it should do so, which could in turn convince some processes to accept
later on. In fact, the collusion of a faulty broadcaster with faultywitnesses could let the number of rounds until acceptance of
the message grow without bounds, i.e., prohibit termination. Still, this can only happen if no obedient process has accepted
yet: By the relay property, all obedient processes accept by the end of the round following acceptance of the first non-faulty
process. Note that since every phase consists of two rounds, processes may accept the message in different phases.
In the original algorithm [29, Fig. 2], any process p can terminate its instance involved in broadcast(m, k) started by
s after having called accept(s,m, k), since any other still active process in the system must have seen p’s echo message
by then. However, in order to deal with link failures, we had to change this detail in a subtle but important way: Link
11 Recall from Section 3 that a symmetric faulty process consistently sends information that is not obviously bad. A wrong transmitter identifier p or
phase number r in a message (p,m, r)would be detected at any receiver.
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failures can produce f raℓ erroneous (echo, s,m, k)messages per round at any obedient process, which could accumulate over
multiple rounds. Thus we consider only messages received in the current round, which in turn requires that we retransmit
(echo, s,m, k) in every additional round (instead of sending it only once and remembering an earlier reception at all active
processes). Since other processes may accept one round after q, any process must retransmit (echo, s,m, k) up to and
including the round following acceptance.
A similar analysis as used for the asynchronous broadcast primitives in [56,46] leads to the following Theorem 6.10.
Note that in our context the maximum running time L below is in fact known in advance, since all broadcast instances can
be terminated (even without accepting a message) once the Byzantine agreement algorithm ST using this primitive has
terminated.
Theorem 6.10 (Simulated Broadcast 1). Under the system model of Section 3 with fa, fs, fo, fm, f rℓ , f
ra
ℓ , f
s
ℓ , f
sa
ℓ ≥ 0 and n >
3fa + 2fs + 2fo + fm + f sℓ + f saℓ + 2f rℓ + 2f raℓ , the simulated broadcast primitive of Fig. 4 guarantees correctness (C), uniform
unforgeability (U), and uniform relay (R). During 0 < L phases (where L is the maximum number executed), at most (2L−1)n+1
broadcasts of (1+ log2 n+ |m| + log2 L)-bit messages are performed by obedient processes.
Proof. We show each of the three properties separately:
Uniform correctness: Since the sender s is non-faulty, n − fp_all − f sℓ non-faulty processes receive the message (init,m, k) in
round 2k and send(echo, s,m, k) to all processes in round 2k+1. Hence, every obedient process receives (echo, s,m, k) from
at least n− fp_all − f sℓ − f rℓ distinct processes in round 2k+ 1 and thus accepts(s,m, k) in round 2k+ 1, i.e., in phase k.
Uniform Unforgeability: The proof of this property proceeds by contradiction: Assume that some obedient process p
accepts(s,m, k) in some phase l ≥ k, although the obedient process s did not execute broadcast(m, k) and hence did
not send any (init,m, k) message in round 2k. In this case at most f saℓ obedient processes might have received (init,m, k)
as the result of a spurious send link failure at s, such that at most fa + fs + f raℓ + f saℓ (echo, s,m, k) messages might arrive
at any obedient process. Since fa + fs + f raℓ + f saℓ < n − 2fa − fs − 2fo − fm − f sℓ − 2f rℓ − f raℓ , no obedient process, except
the at most f saℓ ones that received an initmessage in the first round and thus retransmit echo (cf. line 10), will ever execute
send(echo, s,m, k) in line 11 of Fig. 4. Since p executed accept(s,m, k), however, it must have received (echo, s,m, k) from
at least n− fp_all − f sℓ − f rℓ > fa + fs + f raℓ + f saℓ processes, which provides the required contradiction.
Uniform Relay: Let k′ be the phase inwhich the first obedient process p accepts (s,m, k) in round l ∈ 2k′, 2k′ + 1. Process p
must have received at least n− fp_all − f sℓ − f rℓ echo-messages from different processes in round l, which implies that every
other non-faulty process must have received at least n − 2fa − fs − 2fo − fm − f sℓ − 2f rℓ − f raℓ echo-messages as well by
Lemma 6.1. According to line 10 of Fig. 4, every non-faulty process thus emits an echo-message in round l+ 1. Therefore, by
round l + 1, every obedient process will receive (echo, s,m, k) at least n − fp_all − f rℓ times and will hence accept(s,m, k).
From 2k′ ≤ l ≤ 2k′ + 1 we get that the round l+ 1 must either be in in phase k′ or k′ + 1.
As far as the claimed message complexity of broadcast( ) is concerned, it is of course again impossible to bound the
number of message broadcasts of non-obedient processes. Every process that faithfully executes the algorithm of Fig. 4,
however, executes at most one broadcast of (echo, s,m, k) in every round following the initial one, where only process p
broadcasts (init,m, k). Hence, system-wide, there are atmost n+1 broadcasts in the initial phase, and 2n broadcasts in every
subsequent phase. Hence, during 0 < l ≤ L phases, at most 1 + n + 2(l − 1)n = (2l − 1)n + 1 broadcasts are performed.
The claimed size of (1+ log2 n+ |m| + log2 L) bits per message follows simply from the layout of the echo-messages. 
We can plug in this hybrid simulated broadcast primitive into the hybrid algorithm ST of Section 6.3.1 to obtain a
non-authenticated algorithm ST1 for Byzantine agreement. Note that the bound L upon the number of phases required
by Theorem 6.10 is enforced by the termination of the algorithm in Fig. 3.
Theorem 6.11 (Algorithm ST1). Under the system model of Section 3 with fa, fs, fo, fm, f rℓ , f
ra
ℓ , f
s
ℓ , f
sa
ℓ ≥ 0 and n > 3fa + 2fs +
2fo + fm + f sℓ + f saℓ + 2f rℓ + 2f raℓ , algorithm ST1 (the algorithm of Fig. 3 in conjunction with the simulated broadcast primitive of
Fig. 4) achieves binary Byzantine agreement in at most 2(fa + fs + fo + fm + 1) (basic communication) rounds, with a total of at
most (2(fa + fs + fo + fm + 1)− 1)n2 + n broadcasts ofΘ(log2 n)-bit messages from obedient processes.
Proof. The major part of our theorem follows immediately by combining Theorem 6.9 with Theorem 6.10.
As far as the claimed time and message complexity is concerned, we know from Theorem 6.9 that the algorithm
terminates after fp_all + 1 phases, so any simulated broadcast primitive (of this algorithm) at an obedient process can be
terminated by phase L = fp_all + 1 ≤ n and could generate at most (2(fp_all + 1)− 1)n+ 1 broadcasts of (2 log2 n+ 2)-bit
messages by Theorem 6.10. Since each of the at most n obedient processes calls broadcast( ) at most once by Theorem 6.9,
the proof of Theorem 6.11 is completed. 
6.3.3. Alternative hybrid simulated broadcast primitive
The algorithmpresented in the previous section is clearly not optimalwith respect to link failure resilience. In this section,
we turn our attention to an alternative broadcasting primitive given in Fig. 5, which is optimal in this respect. This comes
at a price, however: The latter requires 3 rounds per phase, instead of only 2, which makes the first alternative more viable
when speed is important. To understand how the additional round improves the resilience, it is instructive to investigate
where the sub-optimality of the protocol in Fig. 4 comes from: It is the uncertainty about the number of processes sending
echo-messages. More specifically, a process can accept amessage only when it is sure that every other obedient process will
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1: /* Code for initial phase k */
2: /* Round 3k: Broadcaster only (entered by broadcast(m, k)) */
3: send(init,m, k) to all nodes [including itself ]
4: /* Round 3k+ 1 and following: All processes */
5: if received(init,m, k) from s in round 3k then
6: send(echo, s,m, k) to all nodes [including itself ] [once]
7: if received(echo, s,m, k) from q then
8: send(confirm, s,m, k, q) to all nodes [including itself ]
9: if received(confirm, s,m, k, q) from at least n− fa − fs − fo − fm − f sℓ − f rℓ processes then
10: witness(s,m, k) = witness(s,m, k) ∪ {q}
11: if |witness(s,m, k)| ≥ n− fa − fs − fo − fm − f sℓ then
12: accept(s,m, k)
13: if |witness(s,m, k)| > fa + fs + f saℓ then
14: send(echo, s,m, k) to all nodes [including itself ] [once]
15: if accepted(p,m, k) 2 rounds ago then
16: terminate
Fig. 5. An alternative broadcasting primitive for simulated authentication, code for process p.
receive sufficiently many echo-messages that trigger sending its own echo-message. Our third round can be understood as
a way to reduce the uncertainty about the number of processes that sent echo-messages.
Just like in the protocol of Fig. 4, a broadcast is started by someprocess s by sending an (init,m, k)message to all processes
also in the algorithm of Fig. 5. Every process receiving such amessage echoes this message as (echo, s,m, k). In an additional
round, all the processes exchange information aboutwhich processes they have received echo-messages from: Every process
confirms that it has received an echo-message from q by broadcasting (confirm, s,m, k, q). If a process receives sufficiently
many such confirmations for one process q, it will add q to its set of witnesses. A process will accept only when there are
enough witnesses for the broadcast. Moreover, when some process p did not receive the init-message for some broadcast,
it will send an echo-message later on only if its witness set becomes large enough (unlike in Fig. 4, where this is triggered
by the reception of sufficiently many echo-messages). Note that p’s echo has to be confirmed by sufficiently many other
processes before p is added to some witness set. Consequently, the acceptance of a broadcast at some obedient process can
be delayed up to two rounds after the first obedient process has accepted. This is compatible with the specification of the
relay property (R), however, since every phase is made up of three rounds here.
From Fig. 5, it is apparent that the exchange of echo and confirm messages is very similar to the broadcast primitive of
Fig. 4. The statements of the following Lemma6.12 can in fact be understood as variants of Correctness (C) andUnforgeability
(U) involving the sending of a echomessage (= broadcasting) and the inclusion of the sender in thewitness set at all obedient
processes.
Lemma 6.12. If
(1) a process p consistently12 sends an echo message for some broadcast, every obedient process adds p to its set of witnesses at
most two rounds later.
(2) an obedient process p never sends an echo message for some broadcast, then no obedient process ever adds p to its witness
set, provided that n > 2fa + 2fs + fo + fm + f sℓ + f rℓ + f saℓ + f raℓ .
Proof. (1) When a process q consistently sends echo for some broadcast in round r , all but f sℓ correct processes will receive
it and respond with a confirmmessage. This results in every obedient process receiving n− fp_all− f sℓ − f rℓ of these messages,
and thus to add q to the appropriate witness set in round r + 2.
(2) When a process does not send echo for some broadcast, at most fa + fs + f saℓ processes may send a ‘‘spurious’’ confirm
message for some process q in any round. Every obedient process p could hence receive up to fa + fs + f saℓ + f raℓ such
confirmations. Since fa+ fs+ f saℓ + f raℓ < n− fp_all− f sℓ − f rℓ , this is not sufficient for p to add q to itswitness set (or to perform
any other action that might cause this indirectly) in any round. 
Theorem 6.13 (Simulated Broadcast 2). Under the system model of Section 3 with fa, fs, fo, fm, f rℓ , f
ra
ℓ , f
s
ℓ , f
sa
ℓ ≥ 0 and n >
2fa + 2fs + fo + fm + f sℓ + f saℓ +max(fa + fo, f rℓ + f raℓ ), the simulated broadcast primitive of Fig. 5 guarantees correctness (C),
uniform unforgeability (U), and uniform relay (R). During 0 < L phases (where L is the maximum number executed), fewer than
1+ n+ n2 broadcasts of (2+ 2 log2 n+ |m| + log2 L)-bit messages are performed by obedient processes.
Proof. Correctness:When a correct process s sends init , then all obedient processes except at most f sℓ receive that message.
Every correct process q among those responds with an echo message. By Lemma 6.12, q will be added to the witness set at
12 That is, p is either non-faulty or symmetric faulty, or is manifest or omission faulty but behaves correctly in round k (recall Section 3.2).
5626 M. Biely et al. / Theoretical Computer Science 412 (2011) 5602–5630
each obedient process pwithin two rounds. These sets thus grow to at least n− fp_all− f sℓ members, which causes p to accept
within 3 rounds, i.e., within the same phase.
Unforgeability: If s never sends an init message for a broadcast, at most f saℓ obedient processes and fa + fs faulty ones can
reply with a matching echo message. These messages can make the witness set at any obedient process p grow to a size
of fa + fs + f saℓ , which is not sufficient to trigger the broadcast of additional echo messages. Consequently, due to (2) of
Lemma 6.12, p’s witness set cannot grow further in later rounds either. Since fa + fs + f saℓ < n − fp_all − f sℓ , process p will
never call accept for this broadcast.
Relay:When some obedient process p accepts a broadcast, at least n− fp_all− f sℓ processesmust be in itswitness set at the end
of some round r . By (1) of Lemma 6.12, all processes in p’s witness set that have consistently broadcast their echomessage
must also show up in the witness sets of all other obedient processes by the end of round r . Thus, every obedient process
ends up with at least n− fp_all − f sℓ − fa − fo > fa + fs + f saℓ processes in itswitness set, which causes all correct ones among
those to broadcast an echo message in round r + 1. This will cause the witness set of every obedient process to grow to
n − fp_all > n − fp_all − f sℓ by the end of round r + 2, since all the confirm messages will have been received by then. Note
that rounds r and r + 2 may lie in the same or in adjacent phases.
The bound on the number of processes in the statement of Theorem 6.13 comes from combining n − fp_all − f sℓ −
fa − fo > fa + fs + f saℓ , (i.e., n > 3fa + 2fo + 2fs + fm + f sℓ + f saℓ ) as required for Relay (and Unforgeability), and
n > 2fa + 2fs + fo + fm + f sℓ + f rℓ + f saℓ + f raℓ as required for Lemma 6.12.
As far as the claimed message complexity is concerned, every process that faithfully executes the algorithm of Fig. 5
executes at most one broadcast of echo in the round following the initial one (where only process s issues a single broadcast
of init), followed by at most n broadcasts of confirm messages (for every echo received) in the subsequent round. Hence,
there are at most 1 + n + n2 broadcasts in the initial phase. Moreover, note that processes do not repeatedly retransmit
echo-messages (as in our first primitive). Therefore, only those processes which did not send echo in the round following
the initial one will send an echo message in a later round, such that the total number of echo messages sent by obedient
processes is bounded by n. This – in turn – implies that no more than n2 confirmmessages are ever sent. Thus this number
of broadcasts by obedient processes is independent of L, and the same as the bound given for the initial phase above. The
claimed size of at most (2+ 2 log2 n+ |m| + log2 L) bits per message follows simply from the layout of messages. 
By plugging in the hybrid simulated broadcast primitive of Fig. 5 into the ‘‘generic’’ hybrid algorithm ST introduced in
Section 6.3.1, a non-authenticated algorithm ST2 for Byzantine agreement is obtained that tolerates hybrid process and link
failures. The followingmajor Theorem6.14 establishes its properties. Comparisonwith the lower bound n > f sℓ+f saℓ +f rℓ+f raℓ
from [57] reveals that it has optimal resilience with respect to link failures. Like the other polynomial algorithms studied
in the previous two sections, however, it suffers from a definitely sub-optimal round complexity, which is more than three
times the lower bound.
Theorem 6.14. Under the system model of Section 3 with fa, fs, fo, fm, f rℓ , f
ra
ℓ , f
s
ℓ , f
sa
ℓ ≥ 0 and n > 2fa + 2fs + fo + fm + f sℓ +
f saℓ + max(fa + fo, f rℓ + f raℓ ), the algorithm ST2 (Fig. 3 in conjunction with the simulated broadcast primitive of Fig. 5) achieves
binary Byzantine agreement in at most 3(fa + fs + fo + fm + 1) rounds, with a total of less than n(1 + n + n2) broadcasts of
Θ(log2 n)-bit messages from obedient processes.
Proof. The major part of our theorem follows immediately from combining Theorem 6.9 with Theorem 6.13. As far as the
claimed message complexity is concerned, we can see from Fig. 3 that every obedient process calls broadcast( ) at most
once by Theorem 6.9, the proof of Theorem 6.14 is completed. 
Theorem 6.9 also allows us to derive a lower bound for the number of processes required for establishing Correctness,
Unforgeability and Relay, cp. [29]: If there were a broadcast primitive that needed only f rℓ + f raℓ + f sℓ + f saℓ processes, it
would be possible to solve Byzantine agreement by means of the algorithm of Fig. 3, thereby violating the lower bound for
consensus [14]. We thus have the following Theorem 6.15, which is tight due to Theorem 6.14:
Theorem 6.15 (Lower Bound). Achievement of Correctness (C), Unforgeability (U), and Relay (R) under the system model of
Section 3 requires n > f rℓ + f raℓ + f sℓ + f saℓ processes.
7. Discussion
In the previous sections, we introduced and analyzed a suite of deterministic agreement algorithms, which prove that it
is not too difficult to adapt such algorithms to work correctly also in the presence of link failures – despite the impossibility
result of [15,10] – if the number of send and receive link failures is suitably restricted. In this section, we will relate
the respective results to each other and to the lower bounds established in the companion paper [14], and discuss some
consequences.
Summary of accomplishments
We introduced a perception-based hybrid failuremodel, which grants every process at most f rℓ receive link failures (with
at most f raℓ non-omission failures among those) and f
s
ℓ send link failures in each round, in addition to at most fa, fs, fo, fm
arbitrary, symmetric, omission, and manifest process failures. Apart from its ability to handle transient and mobile link
failures, in a round-by-round manner, our model can also deal with incomplete communication graphs.
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Form ≥ fa+ fo+1, we analyzed severalm+ 1-round Byzantine agreement algorithms under our failure model, namely,
the non-authenticated OMH as well as its authenticated variants OMHA and ZA, ZAr. Their respective required number of
processes is
nOMH > 2f sℓ + f rℓ + f raℓ + 2(fa + fs)+ fo + fm +m,
nOMHA > 2f sℓ + f rℓ + 2(fa + fs)+ fo + fm +m,
nZA,ZAr > f sℓ + f rℓ + fa + fs + fm + 1.
We also proposed and analyzed a uniform variant of OMH, which achieves agreement and validity even at obedient
processes, at the cost of one additional round.
With respect to message complexity, OMH, OMHA and ZA are exponential; ZAr is a polynomial algorithm that requires
authentication. We also considered several non-authenticated polynomial algorithms, namely, the Phase Queen and Phase
King consensus algorithms, and the Byzantine agreement algorithms ST1 and ST2 (which consist of Srikanth & Toueg’s
algorithm in conjunction with two different broadcasting primitives) under our failure model. The respective number of
processes was found to be
nPhQ > 2f sℓ + 3f rℓ + 3f raℓ + 4fa + 2fs + 2fo + fm,
nPhK > 2f sℓ + 2f rℓ + 2f raℓ + 3fa + 2fs + 2fo + fm,
nST1 > f sℓ + f saℓ + 2f rℓ + 2f raℓ + 3fa + 2fs + 2fo + fm,
nST2 > f sℓ + f saℓ +max(f rℓ + f raℓ , fa + fo)+ 2fa + 2fs + fo + fm.
Compared to the exponential algorithms like OMH, the round complexity of the polynomial algorithms is quite bad:
mOMH = fa + fo + 2,
mPhQ = 2(fa + fs + fo + fm + 2),
mPhK = 3(fa + fs + fo + fm + 2),
mST1 = 2(fa + fs + fo + fm + 1),
mST2 = 3(fa + fs + fo + fm + 1).
Benefits of authentication
It is well-known that authentication considerably improves the resilience of consensus algorithms against arbitrary
process failures. Our analysis revealed that the same is true for arbitrary link failures, which are effectively prohibited by
authentication: Neither f raℓ nor f
sa
ℓ appears in the required number of processes of OMHA, ZA and ZAr.
Moreover, it turned out that authenticated algorithms specifically designed for written messages are superior over
algorithms adapted from solutions based on oral messages: Whereas OMHA does not profit much from authentication,
ZA and ZAr benefit considerably—but also depend critically upon it. In particular, OMHA degrades to OMH and hence
only requires an additional f raℓ in the number of processes even if all signatures are broken, whereas every process with
a compromised signature must be considered as arbitrary faulty and therefore counted in fa in ZA.
Process failures
With respect to process failures, there are several interesting observations. First, it is apparent that (send) omission faulty
processes appear as 2fo in the requirednumber of processes,which contrastswith the optimal resilience ofn > fo established
in [3]. We conjecture that this is inevitable in hybrid failure models if there are also arbitrary faulty processes in the system
(fa > 0).Moreover, it turns out that an algorithm (PhaseQueen)may have a considerably sub-optimal resiliencewith respect
to some class of process failures (arbitrary), but may nevertheless have very good tolerance against other failures.
The probablymost striking result is the required number of nodes of algorithm ST2. It reveals that there is some ‘‘sharing’’
of resource redundancy for tolerating process and link failures: Rather than just the sum f rℓ + f raℓ + fa + fo, the expression
for nST2 contains a term max{f rℓ + f raℓ , fa + fo}. Hence, nodes required for tolerating arbitrary process failures are also used
for tolerating arbitrary link failures, and vice versa.
Link failures
In a companion paper [14], we established lower bounds for the required number of processes and rounds in our link
failure model: For omission resp. arbitrary link failures, n > f rℓ + f sℓ resp. n > f sℓ + f saℓ + f rℓ + f raℓ processes are required. In
order to tolerate f process crashes (or more severe failures), in addition to link failures, at least f + 2 rounds are required.
Our results reveal that these lower bounds are indeed all tight, cp. the expressions for ZAr , nST2 andmOMH above.13
13 Recall our discussion of how to convey consensus lower bounds to Byzantine agreement algorithms with n− 1 receivers in Section 4.
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Table 1
Overview of our results: Resilience against arbitrary process failures (all
other resiliences are the same, hence n0 = Cfa + 2(fs + fo) + fm), and
additional costs of tolerating f rℓ = f sℓ = fℓ omission resp. arbitrary link
failures in terms of number of processes and number of rounds (m0 is
the number of rounds for fℓ = 0).
Algorithm Auth.? Cfa Omissions Arbitrary # rounds
OMH No 3fa n0 + 3fℓ n0 + 4fℓ m0 + 1
OMHA Yes 3fa n0 + 3fℓ n0 + 3fℓ m0 + 1
ZA&ZAr Yes fa n0 + 2fℓ n0 + 2fℓ m0 + 1
PhQ No 4fa n0 + 5fℓ n0 + 8fℓ m0
PhK No 3fa n0 + 4fℓ n0 + 6fℓ m0
ST1 No 3fa n0 + 3fℓ n0 + 6fℓ m0
ST2 No 3fa n0 + 2fℓ n0 + 4fℓ m0
In order to simplify the comparison of our algorithms with respect to link failures, we summarize the associated costs
for f sℓ = f rℓ = fℓ in Table 1: The second resp. third column gives the number of processes required for tolerating fℓ omission
resp. fℓ arbitrary link failures14; n0 denotes the number of processes required for fℓ = 0, where only process failures are
present. The last column gives the number of rounds for either type of link failure;m0 is the number of rounds for fℓ = 0.
First, we note that all our algorithms tolerate up to O

(m+ 1)n2 link failures during the whole execution; recall that fℓ
could be as much asO(n). This dramatically outperforms the ⌊(n− 2)/2⌋ = O(n) resilience of previous work on Byzantine
agreement under link failures (see Section 2). It is important to understand, though, that this does not mean that our
algorithms [except ST2] are resilient to link failures per se. After all, we had to add O(fℓ) processes to n0 in order to mask fℓ
link failures per process, which means that we added O(n2) links. What we really gained, however, is that any link – and
not just the ones added – may experience a failure.
Considering our exponential algorithms, they all match the lower bound for the required number of rounds developed
in [14] and are hence optimal in this respect. As far as the required number of processes is concerned, our best algorithms
need only 2fℓ additional processes to cope with fℓ (purely omissive) link failures per process in each round; for fℓ = 1,
the algorithm of Srikanth & Toueg with the improved broadcast primitive needs only n = 3 processes (in the absence of
process failures), for example. In the case where all fℓ link failures are arbitrary ones, OMH also matches the appropriate
lower bound; OMH is hence optimal for f sℓ = f saℓ , but slightly suboptimal for f saℓ < f sℓ , cf. Remark 6 on Theorem 4.4.
Comparison of the link failure resilience of the Phase Queen and King algorithms with the lower bounds reveals
considerable sub-optimality, in particular in case of arbitrary link failures. Note, however, that both algorithms use constant-
size (1 or 2 bit) messages, which makes them particularly suitable for very-low-bandwidth situations. The algorithms ST1
and ST2, on the other hand, inherit their link failure resilience from the underlying broadcast primitives. Depending on the
number of rounds one wants to spend, the resilience varies from the optimal 2fℓ (omissions only) and 4fℓ (arbitrary link
failures only) for ST2 (3 rounds per broadcast) to 4fℓ resp. 6fℓ for ST1 (2 rounds), with message sizes in the order of log n.
7.1. Model coverage
In [14], we analyzed the model coverage of ‘‘generic’’ distributed algorithms in a simple probabilistic ‘‘benchmarking
scenario’’, where every link in a systemof n processes failswith some probability p, independently, in every round. A detailed
probabilistic analysis for ‘‘reasonable’’ choices of p revealed that our link failure model is the only one that guarantees a
model coverage approaching 1 for n →∞; the coverage of all alternative approaches goes to 0.
In another companionpaper [28],we analyzed themodel coverage of both the exponential and the polynomial algorithms
considered in this paper for substantial link failure rates in small systems. It turned out that the polynomial algorithms
achieve an excellent coverage in almost every setting, and that even the exponential algorithms achieve a very decentmodel
coverage in most cases.
8. Conclusions
In this paper, we introduced a comprehensive perception-based hybrid failure model for synchronous distributed
algorithms, which covers both process and link failures. We showed that several well-known consensus and Byzantine
agreement algorithms can be adapted to work correctly under this model, and analyzed their resilience and round
complexity. The comparisonwith lower bound results for both classic process failures and link failures confirms/reveals that
these bounds are tight, and shows a number of interesting trade-offs. Our findings reveal that the reliable communications
assumption that has usually been employed in the analysis of such algorithms can actually be avoided.
14 That is, f saℓ = f raℓ = 0 respectively f saℓ = f raℓ = fℓ .
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